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International privacy and trade law developed together, but now are engaged in
significant conflict. Current efforts to reconcile the two are likely to fail, and the result
for globalization favors the largest international companies able to navigate the
regulatory thicket. In a landmark finding, this Article shows that more than sixty
countries outside the European Union are now evaluating whether foreign countries
have privacy laws that are adequate to receive personal data. This core test for deciding
on the permissibility of global data exchanges is currently applied in a nonuniform
fashion with ominous results for the data flows that power trade today.
The promise of a global internet, with access for all, including companies from the
Global South, is increasingly remote. This Article uncovers the forgotten and fateful
history of the international regulation of privacy and trade that led to our current crisis
and evaluates possible solutions to the current conflict. It proposes a Global Agreement
on Privacy enforced within the trade order, but with external data privacy experts
developing the treaty’s substantive norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy and trade appear to be in a mortal contest. Will trade be the death of
data privacy, as international flows of personal information across the world place
our privacy at risk? Or will data privacy be the death of trade, as restrictions on
information flows make modern trade increasingly difficult?
Countries across the world are now putting barriers in place to personal data
traveling across borders and raising threats to the mutual dependence of privacy
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and trade. In addition, decisions of the highest court in the European Union, the
European Court of Justice, have greatly complicated transfers of personal data
outside the European Union.1 In the wake of these judgments, European authorities
have questioned or, in certain cases even banned, the use of American technology
because these products transfer personal data to the United States. The decisions
implicate Microsoft Office, Amazon Web Services, Cloudflare, MailChimp, and,
most recently, Google Analytics.2 LinkedIn remains banned in Russia because it
refuses to store user data in that country.3
Cross-border transfers of personal information are now the lifeblood of
modern trade, but those exchanges are increasingly imperiled.4 Moreover, privacy
regulations implicate not just services, but modern goods as well. A Mercedes car
now contains some 100 million lines of code, 100 electronic control units, and ten
operating systems.5 Tesla stores the data produced by its Chinese cars in that
jurisdiction to comply with national data localization regulations.6 Even
toothbrushes and dolls can be internet-connected.7 Trade in goods and services
Case 311/18, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020) [hereinafter Schrems II]; Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct.6, 2015) [hereinafter Schrems I].
2 European authorities have opened an inquiry into the use of Amazon Web Services and Microsoft
Office 365 by public institutions. European Data Protection Supervisor, The EDPS opens two investigations
following the “Schrems II” Judgment (May 27, 2021), https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/pressnews/press-releases/2021/edps-opens-two-investigations-following-schrems_en. The American
cybersecurity company Cloudfare has been barred from use in the Portuguese national census. CNPD,
Deliberação/2021/533,
(Deliberation),
GDPR
HUB
(April
28,
2021),
at
https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CNPD_-_Delibera%C3%A7%C3%A3o/2021/533.
The
Bavarian Data Protection Authority has ruled that using Mailchimp newsletters might violate data
protection law. European Data Protection Board, Bavarian DPA (BayLDA) calls for German company to
cease the use of 'Mailchimp' tool (March 30, 2021), https://edpb.europa.eu/news/nationalnews/2021/bavarian-dpa-baylda-calls-german-company-cease-use-mailchimp-tool_en.
Google Analytics has been found to violate data protection law by authorities in Austria and
France because it transfers personal data to the United States. Datenschuzbehörde, Teilbescheid [Interim
Decision]
(Dec.
22,
2021),
https://privacyblogfullservice.huntonwilliamsblogs.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/28/2022/01/E-DSB-Google-Analytics_DE_bk_0.pdf; CNIL, Use of Google
Analytics and data transfers to the United States: the CNIL orders a website manager/operator to comply (Feb. 10,
2022), https://www.wired.com/story/google-analytics-europe-austria-privacy-shield/.
3 Reuters, LinkedIn fails to agree with Russia on restoring access to site (May 7, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-linkedin-russia-ban/linkedin-fails-to-agree-with-russia-onrestoring-access-to-site-idUSKBN16E20Q
4 As Wired concisely sums up, “Europe’s regulators … don’t like the way U.S. tech companies send
data across the Atlantic.” Matt Burgess, Europe’s Move Against Google Analytics Is Just the Beginning, WIRED
(Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.wired.com/story/google-analytics-europe-austria-privacy-shield/.
5 Lucian Cernat, The (Cyber) Security of Global Supply Chains: Is this a Blind Spot for Industry 4.0?, European
Center for International Political Economy, https://ecipe.org/blog/cyber-security-global-supplychains-industry-40/ (describing a Mercedes S-class).
6 James Vincent, Tesla will store Chinese car data locally, following government fears about spying, THE VERGE
(May 26, 2021), at https://www.theverge.com/2021/5/26/22454369/tesla-china-datacenter-processlocally-spying-fears.
7 Benny Evangelista, Smart toothbrushes the latest Internet of Things battleground, SFGATE (June 9, 2016)
https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Smart-toothbrushes-the-latest-Internet-of-Things7971669.php (noting that the brush provides “a three-dimensional map of the user’s teeth”); Philip
1
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alike now requires transborder data flows. While the addition of intellectual
property to the trade regime has received a great deal of recent attention, there has
been less awareness of the trade law regulating services, even though it governs the
principal economic activity of developed nations, and increasingly of developing
nations.8
Early scholarship recognized the critical role of privacy in international trade.
In 1999, Joel Reidenberg called for a “General Agreement on Information Privacy”
to sit alongside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services.9 In 2002, Gregory Shaffer found hope for a
reconciliation between privacy and trade through mutual recognition systems.10 Yet,
today, some scholars would exempt privacy measures from trade law almost
entirely, arguing that, as a fundamental right, privacy should not be subject to
disciplines that liberalize trade. For example, Kristina Irion, Svetlana Yakovleva,
and Marija Bartl propose to “fully exempt[] the existing and future [European
Union] legal framework for the protection of personal data” from the scope of
future EU trade treaties.11 Indeed, in its trade negotiations, the European Union
seeks a blanket exemption for “safeguards it deems appropriate to ensure the
protection of personal data and privacy.”12 In short, the European Union today
seeks to ensure that trade rules can never be used to question any action that it
declares to be promotive of privacy.
This Article shows that data privacy law and contemporary international trade
law were created simultaneously and in contemplation of the other.13 But in taking
the historic step in 1994 of creating the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), governments also crafted an open-ended, yet cabined, privacy exception
Oltermann, German parents told to destroy doll that can spy on children, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/17/german-parents-told-to-destroy-my-friend-cayladoll-spy-on-children.
8 In 2021, for example, U.S. personal consumption of services ($10 trillion) was double that of goods
($5 trillion). BEA, Gross Domestic Product (2021), https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domesticproduct.
9 Joel Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STANFORD L. REV.
1315, 1360-62 (1999) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Resolving]. Two years later, Reidenberg announced, “an
international treaty is likely the only sustainable solution for long-term growth in trans-border
commercial interchange.” Joel Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUSTON L.REV.
717, 719 (2001).
10 Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to
Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUMBIA J. EUROPEAN
L. 29 (2002).
11 Kristina Irion, Svetlana Yakovlev, & Marija Bartl, Trade and Privacy: Complicated Bedfellows? How to
Achieve Data Protection-Proof Free Trade Agreements (2016) [hereinafter Trade and Privacy],
https://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.545479. For other scholarship with this perspective, see Svetlana
Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, Pitching Trade Against Privacy, 10 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 201 (2020);
Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free Trade in Services, and EU Law on Privacy
and Data Protection, 2 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 191 (2016).
12 European Commission, Horizontal provisions for cross-border data flows and for personal data protection (in EU
trade
and
investment
agreements)
(May
2018),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/may/tradoc_156884.pdf.
13 See infra Part I.A.3.
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in this treaty.14 This Article terms this non-resolution, the “Privacy Bracket.”15
GATS neither establishes global minimum standards for privacy, nor provides an
international process for creating such standards. It simply allows signatory nations
to protect privacy so long as this action can be said to be “necessary.” The result
has been a regulatory thicket of divergent privacy rules inconsistently applied. The
harm is to the promise of an internet that would permit workers in the Global South
to provide services and goods to consumers and businesses in the Global North.
Ever-increasing privacy hurdles run the risk of restricting the provision of higher
value information-based business to the Global North.
The current global regulation of privacy and trade has reached a crisis point.
In response, this Article proposes a Global Privacy Agreement, a new treaty, and
one, like GATS, to be anchored within the World Trade Organization. As her term
ended in 2021, outgoing UK privacy commissioner Elizabeth Denham called for a
“Bretton Woods for data.”16 The Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 established
the modern basis of the international economic order. This Article takes up
Commissioner Denham’s call and offers a regime for harmonizing data privacy and
trade.
Our argument unfolds in three steps. Part I first uncovers the forgotten shared
history of data privacy and international trade law that led to GATS.17 It reveals that
the tension between privacy and trade was part of the raison d’être for this pathbreaking trade agreement. Both the United States and the European Union worried
that their trade in services would be blocked by data flow restrictions in other
countries, and thus sought the expansion of international trade rules to govern
services. Beginning at this time, the European Union also created Europe-wide data
protection law so that national privacy rules in its member states would not become
a stumbling block to intra-European trade.18 Yet, at the same time, it proposed, and
the U.S. agreed to, the Privacy Bracket, which set the stage for the current threat to
cross-border trade.
Part I then turns to the reckoning, the crisis in international data flows, which
is driven by developments in global data privacy law. Almost all of the discussions
of “adequacy,” a core feature of global data privacy, focus on how the European
Union determines whether a foreign jurisdiction’s data protection law meets this
standard.19 Yet, in a major empirical finding, this Article identifies the creation of

General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(c) (ii), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
15 See infra Part I.A.1.
16 Elizabeth Denham, Solving the billion-dollar question, Global Privacy Assembly (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://globalprivacyassembly.org/solving-the-billion-dollar-question-how-do-we-build-on-thefoundations-of-convergence/.
17 See infra Part I.A.2.
18 For a discussion, see Paul M. Schwartz, The Data Privacy Law of Brexit, 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN LAW 111, 123-24 (2021).
19 This perspective as displayed most recently in coverage of the post-Brexit UK-EU adequacy
discussions. Daphne Leprince-Ringuet, A major international data flow problem just got resolved, ZDNET
14
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adequacy standards in sixty-one countries outside the European Union.20 This littleexplored phenomenon is part of a larger development, which is the splintering of
data privacy standards. The result is widely divergent requirements for data
transferring entities, which increase compliance costs and limit hopes of a new
global distribution of economic opportunities.
Part II examines the models that nations have developed to solve the privacy
or trade conundrum. The first model, which is associated with the United States,
favors trade over privacy. It proceeds through development of free trade
agreements strictly limiting data privacy measures that might conflict with free data
flows. The second model, one favored by the European Union, promotes data
privacy over trade. Finally, the third model, one accepted by both the United States
and European Union, establishes accountability mechanisms that permit entities to
opt into privacy protections for international data flows. This Article’s innovative
taxonomy leads to a remarkable conclusion, which is that both the United States
and European Union have converged on the need for an escape valve, that is, a
mechanism to prevent a ruinous blockage in the world’s data flows.21
Part III turns to solutions. It identifies underlying normative considerations
underlying global trade and data privacy. In a correction to current scholarship, it
argues that both privacy and trade share important values.22 The global trade regime
seeks more than neo-liberal market optimization. Trade law can also promote the
global democratization of opportunity. As for privacy, its values include selfdetermination and democratic community. Part III then explores three possible
solutions to the crisis: “muddling through” within the current policy framework;
heightening enforcement cooperation through a new Global Privacy Enforcement
Treaty; and, finally, a new substantive Global Privacy Agreement. We champion the
last approach, but explore the virtues and drawbacks associated with each solution.
Finally, a few words about terminology. For conceptual clarity, this Article
employs three related but distinct terms: “data protection”; “information privacy”;
and “data privacy.” “Data protection” is the accepted, standard term applied to
Europe’s body of law concerning the processing, collection, and transfer of
personal data. It is also the favored term in most countries outside the United States,
even in such common law nations as the United Kingdom.23 Although U.S. law
lacks such a uniformly accepted single term, it tends to rely on the expression
“information privacy.”24 When this Article discusses the concept to refer to the area
generally, this Article uses the terms “data privacy” or “privacy.”

(June 22, 2021), https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-major-international-data-flow-problem-just-gotresolved-but-another-row-is-already-brewing/.
20 See infra Part I.A.B.1 and Appendix I.
21 See infra Part II.C.
22 See Part III.A.
23 For example, a leading treatise to U.K. data protection law, is ROSEMARY JAY, DATA PROTECTION
LAW AND PRACTICE (2020).
24 Hence, a leading casebook in this area in the United States is DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL M.
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (7th ed. 2021).
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I. THE BRACKETING AND THE RECKONING
Data privacy law and international trade law, as we know them today, came
into their own in the early 1990’s. While each had earlier incarnations, they went
global together. This Part tells the story of how the modern regimes of data privacy
law and international trade law were built in full contemplation of each other.
Nonetheless, the international trade regime ultimately chose to defer decisionmaking about privacy, and to allow it to remain the realm of individual nations,
subject to certain limitations. The result has generated the current state of crisis for
global data flows.
A. The Privacy Bracket
In 1994, the nations of the world finalized the new international trade order
with the conclusion of the monumental Uruguay Round of multilateral
negotiations. This process established the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
introduced, for the first time, services to the global trade rules, which had previously
governed only goods.25 With the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
each signatory country committed to liberalize trade in certain specified services by
agreeing to provide market access and equal treatment to suppliers from other
WTO member states.26 The goal was to ensure that those suppliers were treated as
well as its own nationals, and that countries would not play favorites among the
other member states. With the addition of services, the international trade order
expanded its domain dramatically.
GATS sets up a comprehensive framework of coverage by extending both to
services where the supplier is present within the territory of the member, and those
where the supplier is remote.27 The treaty’s overarching goal is to create a stable
climate for global trade and to promote competition and market liberalization,
consistent with each nation’s regulatory goals.
1. The Privacy Bracket and Its Meaning
How then would the new global trade order deal with data privacy? Some
today might assume that privacy was not a significant concern in this pre-internet
area, but the governments that negotiated GATS did recognize that trade in services
implicated data privacy. Indeed, as this Part demonstrates, the issue of transborder
data flows has been on the global agenda since the 1980s along with an
understanding that many of these flows involved personal information, and, hence,

Bernard Hoekman, The General Agreement on Trade in Services, in READINGS ON THE NEW WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (OECD 1994).
26 See GATS, supra note 14, at arts. II (most-favored-nation treatment), XVI (market access), & XVII
(national treatment).
27 See GATS, supra note 14, at art. I(2) (describing modes of supply).
25
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implicated privacy. Yet, the GATS negotiators in 1994 decided to largely exclude
privacy laws from the new international trade regime for services.
GATS sets out the Privacy Bracket as well as a number of other exceptions in
its Article XIV.28 The exceptions permit member states to take measures that might
otherwise violate the treaty, that is, to leave these areas outside of the treaty’s reach
under certain conditions. These matters include the protection of public order and
human health as well as the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices. As
for the Privacy Bracket, Article XIV(c)(ii) contains the critical exception:
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any Member of measures . . . necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations . . . including those relating to: the
protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of
personal data. . . .29
The import of this language is clear: rather than establishing global minimum
standards for privacy or developing an international process for creation of such
standards, the GATS agreement brackets the issue of privacy.
GATS did not simply create a privacy exception, but also set limits on its
scope. Like the other exceptions in Article XIV, GATS seeks to limit the possible
misuse of its exclusion for privacy. For example, a signatory nation might claim to
be regulating properly within an excluded area, but really be seeking to benefit one
of its domestic industries. Hence, before the cited language above, Article XIV
begins with a general limitation on all its exceptions by making them “[s]ubject to
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services.”30 The
language of the privacy exclusion, then adds a specific requirement that the adopted
measure be “necessary” for the protection of data privacy.31
Rather than resolve the complications raised by the flow of personal data
across borders, GATS decided in 1994 not to engage with the question of how best
to protect privacy amid a growing global trade in personal data. By bracketing
privacy, GATS deferred to the future the difficult decisions on when a privacy
measure that restrains trade is necessary or discriminatory. At the same time, the
Privacy Bracket has considerable built-in complexity and several weak points. Most
crucially, it can only be justified under relatively stringent tests, though WTO
tribunals have yet to police it. These issues merit exploration at this juncture.
First, a privacy restriction as well as the other exceptions in Article XIV must
be “necessary.” In non-privacy contexts, the determination of whether such a
restriction is necessary has been found to turn on whether a “reasonably available”
alternative exists that achieves the same policy goals, but is less trade restrictive. 32
Id. at art. XIV.
Id. at art. XIV(c) (i) (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, § 304–305 , WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
28
29
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Second, as the general limitation on all GATS exceptions states, the privacy
restriction should not constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on trade in services.”33 As Rolf Weber and Dominic Staiger have
observed, such a demonstration of non-discrimination demands “consistency of
enforcement.”34 For example, this test would require that a GATS signatory did not
single out one state or another for tougher application of extraterritorial provisions
found in its data privacy law. Thus, the privacy exception is limited by a requirement
that it not be disguised protectionism or favoritism.
Third, and surprisingly, the bounds of the Privacy Bracket have remained
untested since its creation in 1995. There is a process for nations to complain about
misuse of Article XIV(c)(ii), which would be through the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding. While many countries, including the United States, have
brought claims about violations of services trade commitements, no country has yet
sought to test a potentially discriminatory use of the Privacy Bracket. Were a privacy
law to be contested, the scholarship agrees that a WTO Tribunal would be obliged
to use a “holistic necessity analysis through a ‘weighing and balancing’ test.”35 But,
as Neha Mishra points out, there is “no international consensus” on the proper
range of “tools used to achieve cybersecurity/privacy.”36
In contrast to this official inaction, leading scholars agree that today’s data
privacy law and practices might well exceed the bounds of the Privacy Bracket.
Scholars have, in particular, singled out EU data protection law as problematic.
Kristina Irion, Svetlana Yakovleva, and Marija Bartl argue, “Demonstrating the
required ‘consistency of enforcement’ could be a challenge for the EU, in particular
with a view to administering and adopting adequacy decisions by the
Commission.”37 In the assessment of Mira Burri, “[I]t can well be maintained that
there are less trade restrictive measures that are reasonably available for achieving
the EU’s desired level of data protection.”38 Recall that an ironclad requirement of
Article XV for use of the Privacy Bracket is that the adopted measure be
“necessary.” If less trade restrictive measures are available, the data privacy measure
in question is likely to be deemed to be disguised protectionism, and, hence, invalid
under GATS. Finally, Christopher Kuner observes that the European Union
employs its test for judging the permissibility of international data transfers in part

GATS, supra note 14, at art. XIV.
ROLF H. WEBER & DOMINIC STAIGER, TRANSATLANTIC DATA PROTECTION IN PRACTICE 58
(2017).
35 Neha Mishra, Privacy, Cybersecurity, and GATS Article XIV: A New Frontier for Trade and Internet
Regulation?, 19 WORLD TRADE REV. 341, 356 (2020).
36 Id. at 358.
37 Irion et al., Trade and Privacy, supra note 11, at 55.
38 Mira Burri, Interfacing Privacy and Trade, 53 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 35, 66 (2021).
33
34
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using political criteria.39 In contrast, GATS requires an analysis based on objective
factors in determining the permissibility of recourse to the Privacy Bracket.40
In sum, the existing approach to privacy in trade law strictly delimits the
privacy exception within a demanding test for non-discrimination and a required
comparison of alternative, less trade-restrictive measures to promote privacy.
However, these limitations of GATS Article XIV have yet to be invoked through
dispute resolution. Instead, the Privacy Bracket opened the way for numerous
countries to enact requirements limiting transborder data flows from their territory.
While GATS did not entirely disregard privacy, it pushed back to a later day any
hard decisions and invited each nation to go its own way.
2. The Pre-History of the Bracket
Having delineated the contours of the current resolution in GATS of possible
conflicts between privacy and trade, this Article now describes the path to this
decision. Today, it is commonplace to assume that international trade law failed to
grapple with issues of privacy because cross-border data flows were largely
unknown at the time of GATS.41 Yet, the pre-Uruguay Round policy debate
recognized that issues of privacy and trade were intertwined.
Before GATS, a wide range of commentators in multiple fora worried that
foreign privacy laws might interfere with a free flow of information. For example,
the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing in 1980 on international data flows
at which the Chairman of the Government Information and Individual Rights
Subcommittee described “the protection of personal privacy” as a possible new
“barrier[] to trade.”42 Two speakers at the hearing warned of a future balkanization
of information laws, including a heighted burden on U.S. firms “having to meet the
variegated requirements of different countries’ laws and regulation.”43
This awareness of a link between privacy and trade also led to the two leading,
first-generation international guidelines regarding data privacy. These are the
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (1980)
of the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Convention for the
Christopher Kuner, Developing an Adequate Legal Framework for International Data Transfers, in
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 263, 266 (Serge Gutwirth et. al eds. 2009). Kuner notes, for
example that the decision finding Argentina adequate “was ultimately approved because of politics.”
Id.
40 Mishra, supra note 35, at 350; Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, ¶ 304.
41 See, e.g., Mishra, supra note 35, at 350 (“Being a pre-internet era treaty, the provisions contained in
GATS were not designed keeping in mind the public policy challenges of a digital era, particularly those
related to cross-border data transfers via the internet.”); Shane Tews, Are privacy laws compatible with
international trade, AEI, https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/are-privacy-laws-compatiblewith-international-trade-highlights-from-my-conversation-with-nigel-cory/ (“The trade rules we have
under the World Trade Organization are relics of the 19th century and are just not ready for today’s
digital 21st century”).
42 International Data Flow: Hearings Before a Subcommittee. of the House Committee on
Government Operations, 96th Cong. 1 (1980) (statement of Rep. Richardson Preyer, Chairman, Gov’t Info.
and Individual Rights Subcomm.).
43 Id. at 114 (statement of Robert E. Walker, Vice President, Continental Illinois Bank).
39
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Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention
108) (1981) of the Council of Europe.44
Prior to these guidelines, the United States and Western Europe had been
active in important policy discussions about data privacy followed by the enacting
of pioneering data privacy laws. An influential 1973 white paper from the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) first developed a code of
so-called Fair Information Practices (FIPs).45 The early statutes and the HEW paper
demonstrate an emerging debate about an intellectual framework of best practices
for the processing of personal data. The OECD Guidelines and the Council of
Europe’s Convention 108 also demonstrate that this global conversation about
privacy protection had trade considerations in mind.
The OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980 represent an important, early “soft
law” implementation of FIPs. The OECD is a group of leading industrialized
countries, including the United States, concerned with global economic and
democratic development.46 The OECD Guidelines are a non-binding framework,
that is, soft law, which Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer define as representing
a continuum between “fully binding treaties and fully political commitment.”47 The
OECD Guidelines seek to influence policymaking by offering what Guzman and
Meyer might call a “focal point for cooperation.”48 Indeed, the Guidelines have
assisted nations in developing a lingua franca for discussing data privacy issues.
The OECD Guidelines seek more uniform treatment of personal data
throughout the world in order to protect privacy as well as to keep personal data
flowing globally. As the preface to the Guidelines declares, “[T]here is a danger that
disparities in national legislations could hamper the free flow of personal data across
frontiers . . . caus[ing] serious disruption in important sectors of the economy, such
as banking and insurance.”49 The Guidelines devote four sections to international
transfers. Their cornerstone idea is to obligate OECD members “to take all
reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that transborder data flows of personal
data, including transit through a Member country, are uninterrupted and secure.”50
The Guidelines call for a state to “refrain from restricting transborder flows of
personal data between itself and another Member country except where the latter

Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Council Recommendation Concerning Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80) (58)
final (Oct. 1, 1980) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. 108
[hereinafter Convention 108].
45 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens xxxxiii (1973).
46 For more about the OECD, see OECD, Together, we create better policies for better lives,
https://www.oecd.org/about/
47 Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 173 (2010).
48 Id. at 176.
49 OECD Guidelines, supra note 44, at Preface.
50 Id. at Par. 16.
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does not yet substantially observe these Guidelines or where the re-export of such
data would circumvent its domestic privacy legislation.”51
Finally, the Guidelines seek to ensure proportionality in domestic privacy
legislation. It states, “Member countries should avoid developing laws, policies and
practices in the name of the protection of privacy and individual liberties, which
would create obstacles to transborder flows of personal data that would exceed
requirements for such protection.”52 Thus, already in 1980, we see the germ of a
concept that later appears in GATS, which is to mandate the least trade-restrictive
privacy measures available to cabin any use of privacy law as a form of disguised
protectionism.
Further evidence of a linkage between privacy and trade occurs in the Council
of Europe’s Convention 108. A separate organization from the European Union,
the Council of Europe is the leading human rights organization of the continent
with forty-seven member states, including all twenty-seven EU members.53
Convention 108 is an international treaty, which nineteen countries had already
acceded to by the mid-1990’s when GATS was adopted. Prior to the European
Union’s involvement in the area of data privacy, the Convention was the most
important Europe-wide agreement regarding the processing of personal data.54 It is
a “non-self-executing” treaty, which means it requires signatory nations to enact
domestic data protection legislation to give effects to its principles and to provide a
common core of safeguards for personal data processing.55 It draws on the kinds
of FIPs developed in the HEW’s White Paper and present in pioneering European
privacy laws in France, Germany, and Italy.56
Convention 108 also offers a solution to twin threats raised by international
data flows: data havens and export licenses. The explanatory report for Convention
108 explained that some “data users might seek to avoid data protection law
controls by moving their operations, in whole or in part, to ‘data havens,’ i.e.
countries which have less strict data protection laws, or none at all.”57 Some
countries might respond to the problem of data havens by demanding “a license for
export” of data. By committing to the Convention, countries could avoid a race to
the bottom (the data haven) and obviate a need to hamper data trade (by imposing
licenses for export).
Accordingly, Convention 108 requires free flows of data among signatory
nations unless otherwise expressly provided. The most important of its exceptions
to its free flow rule applies to a signatory national that has enacted “specific

Id. at Par. 17.
Id. at Par. 18.
53
See Council of Europe, Values: Human Rights, Democracy, Rule of Law,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values.
54 COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY 133–36 (1992).
55 Id. at 135.
56 Id.
57 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Par. 9 (Jan. 28, 1981).
51
52
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regulations for certain categories of personal data.”58 Under the Convention,
signatory nations that provide these specific regulations, which are to protect
sensitive information, are permitted to block data exports to another treaty party
that lacks equivalent levels of protection.59 While the Convention does not explicitly
discuss transfers of personal data to non-signatory nations, leading treatises of the
era interpreted it as permitting restrictions on data transfers to lands without
equivalent privacy standards.60
There is a final element in this pre-GATS landscape regarding international
data transfers. By the mid-1980’s, many national European data protection laws
expressly permitted the blocking of international transfers of personal information.
Various approaches were taken at that time in Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.61 These included nations, such
as Portugal and Spain, that explicitly set out an “equivalency” standard, and those,
such as Belgium and France, that merely suggested that some international data
transfers would be impermissible, including to other European nations.62 Other
countries, such as Denmark and the United Kingdom, lacked explicit use of
“equivalency” standard in their statutes, but called for treatment of transferred
personal information in the receiving nation that would be consistent with native
protection.63 As for Germany, its Federal Data Protection law offered a complex
bifurcated scheme for public and private sector transfers.64 At the time, however,
scholars agreed that both statutory sections prohibited data transfers to nations
whose protection was not equivalent to German standards.65 Thus, before GATS,
privacy law in the 1980’s cast a shadow on international trade, which was a looming
threat of data embargoes.
3. Present at the Creation: The Uruguay Round
When the Uruguay Round launched in Punta Del Este in 1986, in a process
that would determine the new global international trading order, the relationship
between privacy and trade was well-established. Indeed, as demonstrated above,
international guidelines as well as transnational instruments had developed a series
of nascent responses to fears of imperiled global data flows.
A key goal of the proponents of the agreement that would become the GATS
was to avoid local barriers to cross-border data flows. As Juan A. Marchetti and
Petros C. Mavroidis explain in their history of GATS, American Express played a

Convention 108, supra note 44, art. 12(3) (a).
Id.at art. 4(1).
60 See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 471, 478 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz, Iowa].
61 Id. at. 471, 474-76.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 474.
64 Id. at 474-76.
65 Id. at 476.
58
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“pivotal” role in lobbying for the multilateral negotiations on trade in services. 66
Testifying in a 1984 House hearing on trade in services, Joan Spero, Executive Vice
President of American Express, noted her company’s reliance on cross-border data
flows. Spero stated, “We simply could not function without rapid, unhindered
global communications …. We use it to authorize a quarter million American
Express card transactions each day throughout the world, with an average response
time of 5 seconds.”67 American Express thus pressed the U.S. government for
international rules that would defend the global flows essential to its business.
The debates within the Uruguay Round on the issue of privacy also confirm
that certain European Union states were key leaders, and the United States, a
laggard, when it came to including privacy protections in the international trade
regime. At the same time, however, the discussions show a remarkable ambivalence
on how strongly to protect privacy, even on the part of European states. The Nordic
countries were the first to propose that the trade negotiations respect privacy
protections. Writing on behalf of the other Nordic countries in 1985, Sweden stated,
“[T]echnological change will bring about increasingly rapid structural adjustment….
Trade in services, which is often intimately linked to high technology, will be highly
affected by this development.… In many cases, it must be recognized that national
regulation exist to safeguard legitimate precautionary interests (national security,
personal privacy, etc.).”68 It was appropriate for Sweden to raise this concern; it had
enacted the world’s first national data protection law in May 1973.69 At the same
time, however, the Swedish submission to the trade negotiations warned of the need
to “counteract protectionist and arbitrary elements in regulations concerning trade
in services.”70
A final lesson of a close study of the Uruguay Round debates is the forgotten
role of developing countries in seeking explicit recognition of the inclusion of
privacy in the international trade order. Developing countries are often viewed as
lacking agency in the crafting of international institutions, but the negotiation
history reveals a counter-narrative. For example, India repeatedly pressed the
importance of privacy protections in the Uruguay Round negotiations. As early as
1986, India noted the “very specific considerations [with respect to services] such
Juan A. Marchetti & Petros C. Mavroidis, The Genesis of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services),
22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 689, 693-4 (2011). Even as early as the 1980s, American Express depended “on the
rapid transmission of large amounts of data across national borders.” Id.
67 Service Industries: The Future Shape of the American Economy, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 369 (1984) (statement of Joan Edelman Spero, Senior Vice President,
American Express Co.) [hereinafter 1984 Hearings].
68 Submission by the Nordic Countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) on Future Trade
Negotiations 3 in GATT, L/5827 (5 July 1985).
69 On the background to Swedish data protection law, see DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY
IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 230-34 (1992).
70 Submission by the Nordic Countries, supra note 68, 4 (emphasis added). Later that year, Norway and
Sweden proposed that the transmission of personal data across the border should be subject to privacy
protection law. GATT Secretariat, Analytical Summary of Information Exchanged among Contracting Parties,
Revision, MDF/7/Rev.2, para 88 (Nov. 25, 1985).
66
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as … to preserve sovereignty and national security, and the need to preserve the
privacy of individuals.”71 Venezuela reserved concerns over privacy in its schedule
of commitments under the GATS agreement. It explained that “the Venezuelan
constitution protects personal privacy. It is therefore assumed that information will
not be treated in any way contrary to this constitutional guarantee and that in any
case the free consent of the persons to whom the information refers will be
obtained prior to its provision, processing or transfer.”72 During this same
commitments phase, the Dominican Republic explained that its law recognized
privacy as a basic worker right.73
Yet, privacy ultimately disappeared from the GATS agenda except for the
Bracket. When the United States tabled its proposed text for the new agreement for
trade in services in October 1989, privacy was nowhere to be found.74 Then in June
1990, a proposal from the European Community, which was soon to become the
European Union, included privacy among its exceptions, but subject to significant
conditions. Here were the basic elements of the Privacy Bracket: “the parties may
adopt or enforce measure necessary to protect personal data and individual privacy
subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between parties
where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade in
services.”75 Japan’s proposal the following month echoed this approach.76 The final
GATS text on the privacy exception tracked the 1990 proposals from the European
Communities and Japan.
Why was privacy simply bracketed in the international trade negotiations?
There were clear global political economy concerns at play. The U.S. saw itself as a
world leader in information services. In addition to American Express, other leading
companies and industry organizations had testified in Congress in favor of
extending trade disciplines into services. John Eger, the former Director of the
Office of Telecommunications Policy, testifying in the House of Representatives in
1980, called the United States “the OPEC of information.”77 This comparison is
telling: the United States’ economy had been crippled in 1973 and 1979 by OPEC’s
GATT Services, Minutes of the Meeting held on 17-18 April 1986, MDF/W63, para 12 (5 May 1986).
Group of Negotiations on Services, Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round,
Communication from Venezuela - Conditional Offer of Venezuela concerning Initial Commitments in
the Services Negotiations – Revision, MTN.GNS/W/123/Add.1/Rev.2 (9 April 1992).
73 Group of Negotiations on Services, Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round,
Communication from the Dominican Republic - Conditional Offer of the Dominican Republic
concerning Initial Commitments on Trade in Services, MTN.GNS/W/173 (25 October 1993).
74 United States, Uruguay Round - Group of Negotiations on Services - Communication from the
United States - Agreement on Trade in Services Access, MTN.GNS/W/, Oct. 17, 1989 (art. 16, General
Exceptions). As if to emphasize its own priorities, the United States did include exceptions for
intellectual property and the prevention of fraud or deceptive practices; however, these exceptions did
not make it into the final text.
75 Group of Negotiations on Services, Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round,
Communication from the European Communities, MTN.GNS/W/105, Article XV(c) (18 June 1990).
76 Group of Negotiations on Services, Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round,
Communication from Japan, MTN.GNS/W/107, art. 607(c) (10 July 1990).
77 Frank Kuitenbrouwer, The world data war, NEW SCIENTIST, 604 (Sept. 3, 1981) (quoting John Eger).
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control over oil supply and prices. By drawing an analogy with OPEC, Eger
indicated that he anticipated a similar power for U.S. companies should the law
permit them free access to information flows. Similarly, Joan Spero of American
Express labeled data flows “the lifeblood of virtually every major economic
activity.”78
The American interests were clear, but what explains the Europeans agreeing
to bracket privacy? By the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the European
Community had been replaced by the European Union, and, in an official statement
at the time, it had announced, “The European Union accounts for 20% of world
exports of goods and for 30% of exports of services.”79 Given that the European Union
was already more dependent on exporting services than goods, an international
trade agreement, like GATS, that covered services would be a highly welcome
development for it. European companies, like their American counterparts, were
global leaders in finance, insurance, and other professional services, and depended
on cross-border data flows across the world.80 As a consequence, like the United
States, the European Union saw itself as a major beneficiary of free trade in services
and the global data flows they required.
Bracketing privacy allowed regulatory space for a country to provide privacy
protections, but only if these safeguards did not unduly interfere with trade. With
an eye to preserving international data transfers, both the United States and
European Union viewed a strong GATS as helping to curb hurdles to such
information flows. From their joint perspective, a GATS with a Privacy Bracket
provided a short-term solution and a useful delaying tactic—it allowed a more
complete resolution of a reconciliation of privacy and trade while also allowing
countries to continue to develop data privacy law, but only when these laws were
non-discriminatory.
B. The Reckoning
The Bracketing left people across the world wondering whether their data
could travel safely across borders. Each nation would have to decide for itself
whether it was safe to send personal data to a foreign country. The Bracketing
deferred to another day international decision-making about how privacy and trade
were to be reconciled. To add to the complexity, each state could insist on its own
rules, which varied widely across the world. Those rules would differ with respect
to when and what data could be taken out of the country, what data could be
collected, and how and why it could be processed and retained. While the
Bracketing left each nation with the regulatory space to determine its own privacy
laws, as long as they were not unduly trade-restrictive, it also set the stage for today’s
1984 Hearings, supra note 67, at 376.
European
Commission,
The
Uruguay
Round
(Apr.
12,
1994),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_94_24 (emphasis added).
80 Indeed, the European Union is now the world’s largest exporter of services. European Commission,
Goods and Services, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/goods-and-services/.
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crisis. Precisely when the internet made a truly global service possible even for small
enterprises and individuals, a global service would become a huge challenge.
For much of the last quarter century, these worries proved largely theoretical.
For one thing, many nations, including some in Europe, did not have data
protection laws on the books until the last two decades.81 But recent developments
have brought us to crisis. To demonstrate the global privacy crisis resulting from
the Bracketing, this Article proceeds as follows. First, based on a global review of
data privacy laws, this Article shows that the fragmentation of the requirements for
global data exchanges is even greater than many might imagine. Second, this Article
explores the regulatory thicket created by the numerous laws across the world. Even
a strategy of choosing the strictest law for an international enterprise will not work
as a compliance strategy; as it turns out, no law is the strictest on all measures, not
even the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union.82 Finally, this
Part discusses the great burden that diverse data privacy laws place on smaller
companies, including those in Europe.
1. The Splintering of Adequacy
Data privacy law has seen a remarkable diffusion of policy innovations among
different countries. In this area, legal transplants are common. For example,
California gave the world the first data breach notification law, which many other
jurisdictions have now adopted.83 For international data flows, however, the
contribution of the European Union has been decisive. The key EU idea is the
necessity of a governmental power to block data flows to nations without
“adequate” protection. This concept has now been adopted throughout the globe,
but without any common substantive definition of adequacy, and without any
uniform process. The result has been a splintering of the “adequacy” principle. Each
country defines it in different terms and applies it according to its own agenda.
This saga begins with the development of this concept in the European Union,
which permits transfers of personal data to countries outside its borders, so-called
“third countries,” only if these nations have an “adequate” level of protection, as
determined by the European Commission.84 As for the substance of formal EU
adequacy decisions, the Commission has looked to a broad range of factors, now
codified in the GDPR, that require scrutiny of a variety of factors in a third country,
such as the relevant legislation; the presence of rights for individuals; the
safeguarding of judicial and administrative redress; and the availability of recourse
to independent supervisory authorities.85 The constitutional underpinnings of data
protection have also led to an important and continuing role for the Court of Justice
Schwartz, Iowa, supra note 60, 474.
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, art. 45 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
83 Paul M. Schwartz & Edward Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 914, 915
(2007).
84 For a discussion, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, 1265-67.
85 GDPR, supra note 82, at art. 45.
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of the European Union (CJEU) in scrutinizing the legality of adequacy
determinations. In Schrems I (2015) and again in Schrems II (2020), the CJEU
determined that “adequacy” for data transfers meant a level that was “essentially
equivalent” between the EU and the third country.86
How then does the process of obtaining a formal “adequacy” determination
from the European Union work? The applicable procedures are not for the faint of
heart. Typically, the process begins with multiyear discussions and negotiations
between the Commission and a third country.87 These may require the country
seeking the adequacy determination to amend its data privacy laws, or to provide
legally-binding assurances to the European Union. The process then involves a
proposal from the European Commission; an opinion of the European Data
Protection Board; an approval from representatives of EU countries; and the
adoption of a final decision by the European Commission.88 At any time during this
process, there is a possibility for involvement by the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union, which is a body of representatives of government
ministers from each EU country.89 The Parliament or Council can request that the
Commission amend or withdraw an adequacy decision.90
As the rainbow that leads to a pot of gold, an adequacy determination places
a third country on equal footing with any EU member state for purposes of
transborder data transfers. After the decision, the third country can receive personal
data from the EU without further requirements. Yet, the resulting EU green list of
adequate countries currently includes only eight nations outside Europe.91 This
result follows because, as noted in a leading German data protection treatise, the
evaluation of the level of data protection in a third country “is complex and
prolonged.”92
Contrast the scant number of nations on the European Union’s approved list
with the tally of the world’s data privacy laws. Removing the twenty-seven EU
member nations from the tally of 145 countries with such statutes leaves a stark
result: the EU has decided that significantly less than ten percent of the world’s data
protection laws are adequate. This low number is especially notable in light of the
Schrems I, supra note 1, at ¶ ¶ 96-106; Schrems II, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 198-202.
European Commission, Adequacy Decisions: How the EU determines if a non-EU country has an adequate level
of data protection, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimensiondata-protection/adequacy-decisions_en
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 The European Commission currently recognizes Argentina, Canada (commercial organisations),
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay as providing adequate
protection. Adequacy Decisions: How the EU determines if a non-EU Country has an Adequate Level of Data
Protection,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/dataprotection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en. Other adequacy rulings
recognize European territories (Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey), a European principality
with 77,000 people (Andorra), and Switzerland. Id.
92 Peter Schantz, Artikel 45, 970, 972 in DATENSCHUTZRECHT: DSGVO MIT BDSG [Data Protection
Law: GDPR and the BDSG]) (Spiros Simitis et al. eds, 2019).
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fact that most of the world’s data privacy laws follow the European model.93 The
EU process for adequacy determinations appears incapable of keeping up with the
rise of countries with statutes in this area and the increase in global data flows.
As a further complication, the European Union is not the only judge of the
adequacy of privacy laws as many other nations have now taken on this role. While
the European Union pioneered the adequacy approach, much of the world has
embraced it. Our review of global data privacy laws reveals that there are now sixtyone countries outside the European Union whose data laws permit or require
adequacy reviews of foreign jurisdictions before allowing international transfers for
personal data from their borders. Appendix I to this Article sets out these countries.
Why have so many countries adopted an adequacy approach? The Privacy
Bracket seemed to leave the world with little other choice. The Bracketing left
nations in search of mechanisms for safeguarding the personal information of their
residents when it flowed across borders—as would increasingly occur in a world of
trade in digital services and goods. At least in theory, a finding of adequacy offers
the most trade-friendly solution to cross border flows that is also consistent with
ensuring a high level of privacy protection. If the foreign country’s privacy
protections are as good as one’s own, then transferring the personal data
internationally is like transferring it across the street. But highly idiosyncratic results
have followed from the result of the explosion in adequacy approaches and the
activities of many governments now in the business of reviewing each other.
Russia, for example, declares all countries ratifying the Council of Europe’s
Convention 108 to be adequate—even without examining whether there is any
domestic enforcement of the treaty provisions.94 The Roskomnadzor, the Russian
internet regulator, has also declared a number of countries adequate, including
Argentina (which the European Union also declares adequate), but not Uruguay
(unlike the European Union).95 Russia has found adequate some countries in Africa,
including Angola, Benin, Gabon, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia.96
Where the European Commission has repeatedly insisted on a highly specialized
regime to protect data transferred to the United States, Colombia, for example, has
held the United States data protection law to be adequate without special
provisions.97
Moreover, the European Union’s own use of adequacy proves problematic.
As noted, the European Union has only found a handful of countries outside of
Europe to be adequate. Moreover, in Schrems I and Schrems II, the CJEU invalidated
Graham Greenleaf, Countries with Data Privacy Laws, 145 PRIVACY LAWS & BUSINESS INT’L REP. 18
(2019).
94 Data Guidance, Russia, https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/russia-data-protection-overview.
95 Uruguay ratified Convention 108 in 2021. Uruguay Ratifies Convention 108+, COUNCIL OR EUR. (Aug.
9, 2021), https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/-/uruguay-ratfies-convention-108-.
96 Russian Privacy Regulator Adds Countries to List of Nations with Sufficient Privacy Protections, HUNTON
ANDRES KURTH (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/08/16/russian-privacyregulator-adds-countries-list-nations-sufficient-privacy-protections/.
97 Hunton Andres Kurth, Colombia Designates U.S. as “Adequate” Data Transfer Nation,
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/08/15/colombia-designates-u-s-adequate-data-transfernation/.
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data sharing agreements with the United States largely because of concerns about
U.S. intelligence surveillance.98 At the same time, however, EU member states have
their own surveillance laws, as well as intelligence sharing arrangements with the
United States, and it is not clear whether their own citizens have sufficient rights to
challenge that surveillance.99 In sum, the explosion in adequacy standards may mean
the implosion of trade.
2. The Regulatory Thicket
The splintering of adequacy greatly complicates modern international trade,
limiting the transfer of personal data across borders. But the problem is even more
severe: the growing number of countries with comprehensive, but varying data
privacy law makes management of personal data a complex undertaking for any
enterprise that hopes to operate across the globe. Even without any international
transfers of data, the costs of compliance for a global entity are high because data
privacy laws now create a dense thicket of rules that are nearly impossible to
traverse.
According to a census of the world’s data privacy law, there are now one
hundred and forty-five countries with such statutes.100 Graham Greenleaf, the
census-taker, has found that the number of countries enacting such legislation
increased ten percent alone from 2019 to 2020. Among the nations to join the data
privacy club during this period were Barbados, Botswana, Egypt, Jamaica, Nigeria,
Togo, and Uzbekistan.101 This Article has already given one demonstration of the
complexity of these laws in its discussion of adequacy. As a further example of the
complexity of global privacy laws, and one independent of cross-border data flows,
we can examine legal regulation of the granting of consent to data processing.
Consent is a linchpin issue: it is a core fair information practice, and one that
has been long enshrined as providing a basis for the legal processing of personal
data. There are also now a dizzying range of parameters for acceptable consent in
the world’s data privacy statutes. This section will look at five countries and one
sub-jurisdiction, California, and explore different aspects of their regimes governing
consent.102 And spoiler alert: there is no single organizational approach that will
meet all global privacy rules for consent.
As a comparative matter, countries generally agree that consent with respect
to data privacy requires that the “data subject,” that is, the affected party, be
provided with sufficient information to make an informed decision. The surveyed

Schrems I, supra note 1, at ¶ ¶ 96-106; Schrems II, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 198-202.
HENRY FARRELL & ABRAHAM NEWMAN, OF PRIVACY AND POWER 159 (2019); Paul Schwartz,
Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in Germany, in BULK COLLECTION 61, 88-89 (Fred Cate
& James X. Dempsey eds., 2017).
100 Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws 2021: Despite COVID Delays, 145 Laws Show GDPR
Dominance, 169 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 1 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3836348.
101 Greenleaf, supra note 100.
102 These countries are Brazil, California, China, the European Union, India, and Japan. See Appendix
II.
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jurisdictions also allow individuals to withdraw their consent subsequently. But the
details concerning valid consent vary, and do so widely.
Consider first the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), an influential
privacy law for the United States. As a promising initial step towards global
uniformity, the CCPA borrows the language of the leading European data privacy
law, the GDPR, requiring that consent be “freely given, specific, informed, and
unambiguous.”103 So far so good, but the CCPA then permits an opt-out
mechanism for obtaining consent for the sale of personal information.104 An optout requirement means that organizations need not obtain users’ agreement before
processing of their personal data. Rather, an opt-out approach calls for permitting
users to take affirmative action to indicate their refusal to personal data
processing.105 In contrast, the European Commission views consent under the
GDPR as requiring a “positive act (for example an electronic tick-box that the
individual has to explicitly check online or a signature on a form).”106 This approach
is quite different from California’s opt-out approach to the sale of personal
information.
Japan, too, requires consent before the processing of personal information,
subject to certain statutory exceptions.107 At the same time, however, Japan permits
an opt-out option for data transfers to a third party, but only when the transferor
has obtained permission from the Personal Information Protection Commission of
Japan for such transfers.108 In contrast, the GDPR has no referral process
permitting opt-out.
Often the relevant laws specify distinct requirements for certain situations. For
example, Brazil calls for specific consent of the data subject in order for the
controller, the data processing party, to transfer personal data to another
controller.109 In contrast, the GDPR does not have a special requirement for
specific consent for data controller to data controller sharing. As one of the
GDPR’s special requirements, however, the European Data Protection Board has
interpreted it as forbidding the use of “pre-ticked boxes” to indicate agreement to
data sharing.110
The survey of consent in these jurisdictions reveals differences even in
something as seemingly straightforward as the age of consent for children. The issue
GDPR, supra note 82, art. 4.
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (2020) [hereinafter CCPA].
105 CCPA, § 1798.135.
106 European Commission, When is consent valid?, at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/dataprotection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/legal-grounds-processing-data/groundsprocessing/when-consent-valid_en
107 Act on the Protection of Personal Information (Japan), art. 16. For an English translation, see
https://www.ppc.go.jp/files/pdf/APPI_english.pdf.
108 Id. at art. 23(2).
109 Article 7(X) (5) of the LGPD.
110 Under certain member state laws, such as those of Germany, consent to data processing for
marketing purpose sometimes requires the use of not one, but two indications of consent (“double optin”). For a discussion, see MARTIN SCHIRMBACHER, ONLINE-MARKETING-UND SOCIAL-MEDIARECHT [Online Marketing and Social Media Law] 552 (2d ed. 2017).
103
104

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4038531

PRIVACY AND/OR TRADE

22

is one of considerable practical importance. Below the statutory age, parents must
consent before a company can collect personal information from the minor. At the
age of consent and above, the individual can freely agree to collection and use of
their information.
Among the six jurisdictions surveyed, there are at least five different answers
for what age a child must be before parental consent is no longer needed for
collecting their information, as Appendix II to this Article shows. Brazil and India
set the age at eighteen, Japan at fifteen, China at fourteen, and California at
thirteen.111 The European Union sets the age of consent at sixteen, but with an
“opening clause” permitting member states to lower it to thirteen, and different
member states have adopted every age possible between thirteen and sixteen.112
This Article’s multijurisdictional inquiry shows how tricky it is to obtain
consent from data subjects, whether from children or from adults. This task cannot
be resolved by simply adopting the strictest rule because no law is strictest on all
measures. Recourse is not simply possible to the GDPR because there is no uniform
age set for children’s age in the Union. Satisfying the consent requirement of any of
these jurisdictions does not satisfy the consent requirement of all of the others
Finally, many laws go beyond the GDPR’s requirements in additional ways.
For example, the GDPR calls for clarity and intelligibility in its access and notice
rights, but the CCPA requires companies to provide a toll-free telephone number
and website address for consumers to make access requests.113 The CCPA is also
generally more prescriptive about the mode and content of notice at collection.114
3. Harm to SMEs, A Boon to Large Companies
What are the problems caused by the failure to resolve the conflict between
privacy and trade? The end result of the current situation is that only the largest
companies and organizations can manage globalization. At one time, the internet
seemed to promised empowerment for all, including small companies in the world’s
poorest countries, which were to be able to reach the world’s richest markets.115
The hope was for a democratization of trade and a resulting chance for a new global
distribution of economic opportunities. But, increasingly, the reality is that only the
world’s richest companies can manage internet globalization.
For children between 13 and 16, California requires an opt-in approach for the sale of their personal
information (unlike the opt-out approach available for anyone 16 years or older). CCPA § 1798.120.
112 GDPR, supra note 82, at art. 8. Claire Quinn, GDPR Age of “Digital” Consent, PRIVO,
https://www.privo.com/blog/gdpr-age-of-digital-consent. This provisions is a so-called “opening
clause” in the GDPR, permitting national variation from a default. Emilia Mišćenić & Anna-Lena
Hoffmann, The Role of Opening Clauses in Harmonization of EU Law: Example of the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), 2020 EU & COMPARATIVE L. ISSUES & CHALLENGES SERIES 44.
113 CCPA, 1798.130.
114 California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations § 999.305 (2020). California even encourages the use
of a particular icon to opt-out of the sale of one’s information, along with specific alt-text for visuallyimpaired persons. Calif. Atty Gen’l, CCPA Opt-Out Icon, https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa/iconsdownload.
115 ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD IN
COMMERCE 12, 18-19 (2013).
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The consequence of the regulatory thicket and splintering of adequacy has
been harm to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), especially in less developed
countries, and a boon to large companies, especially those in the West. Since many
of the established tech companies are based in the United States, this result may
further favor that side of the Atlantic.116 This possibility is surprising and counterintuitive, especially in light of the sometimes expressed opinion that European data
protection law will tilt the playing field in favor of EU companies.117
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated the increasing complexity of global
data privacy law. In response, data privacy law has undergone a shift to a
compliance-focus and a heavy “managerialization.” Ari Waldman has mapped how
data privacy law promotes the creation of a new class of privacy compliance
professionals who “create internal structures to comply with their version of the
law.”118 Building on Waldman, we wish to suggest that this “managerialization” of
privacy compliance inherently favors large companies and also has consequences
for global distributive justice. Indeed, and as noted above, the result may favor
technology companies in the United States. Many of the largest tech enterprises are
in the United States, and these are the organizations that have invested heavily in
the process of privacy compliance.119
There is more involved, however, than the legal savvy and financial resources
available to these companies. American tech companies begin with a significant
global advantage due to their extensive customer base. By having this existing
relationship with millions or even billions of customers throughout the world, it is
easier for these enterprises to craft processes to comply with changing legal
requirements while also maintaining data-rich relationships with their current
users.120 These connections provide a major head start on any start up. Thus,
Apple’s changes to its operating system in June 2021 announced as promoting
privacy also serve to entrench its favorable market position by leveraging its own
digital ecosystem.121

Leonid Bershidsky, Europe’s Privacy Rules are having Unintended Consequences, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-14/facebook-and-google-aren-t-hurtby-gdpr-but-smaller-firms-are.
117 In the words of President Barack Obama in 2015, “[O]ftentimes what is portrayed as high-minded
positions on issues sometimes is just designed to carve out some of their commercial interests.” Henry
Farrell, Obama says that Europeans are using privacy rules to protect their firms against U.S. competition, WASH.
POST.
(Feb.
17,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2015/02/17/obama-says-that-europeans-are-using-privacy-rules-to-protect-their-firmsagainst-u-s-competition-is-he-right/.
118 ARI WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND 137 (2021).
119 Ashley Rodriguez, Google says it spent “hundreds of years of human time” complying with Europe’s privacy rules,
QUARTZ (Sept. 26, 2018), https://qz.com/1403080/google-spent-hundreds-of-years-of-human-timecomplying-with-gdpr/.
120 Jedidiah Yueh, GDPR Will Make Big Tech Even Bigger, FORBES (June 26, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/26/gdpr-will-make-big-tech-evenbigger/?sh=4b49636e2592
121 Kif Leswing, Apple is Turning Privacy into a Business Advantage, CNBC (Jun. 7, 2021, 6:52 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/07/apple-is-turning-privacy-into-a-business-advantage.html.
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A window into this unintended tilting in favor of larger companies was
provided in the aftermath of Schrems II, the decision of the CJEU in 2020 that
invalidated the Privacy Shield, a data transfer agreement between the European
Union and United States. Following this judgment, the European Data Protection
Board (EDPB), an independent European body composed of representatives of
EU national data protection authorities, offered proposed guidance on cross-border
data flows.122 The hundreds of comments offered to the EDPB in response paint a
revealing picture of the myriad ways that hurdles to cross-border data flows harm
smaller companies and even European enterprises.
The responses to the EDPB begin by touching on issues such as intercompany
data transfers for human resource data in an international enterprise, the possible
isolation of Europe from the global economy, and even the loss of essential
technological services offered by U.S. companies. Perhaps surprisingly, however,
start-up associations across the EU also criticized the proposed rules as harmful to
their growth. For example, app developers in Belgium worried that the EDPB
guidelines would disadvantage small businesses, which, according to them, made up
“70 percent of the participants of the Privacy Shield.”123 Another Belgium-based
group, the Allied for Startups, worried about the “additional costs” of the
supplementary measures that the EDPB would require for cross-border transfers,
noting that “startups have less resources, less time and oftentimes operate with new
technologies.”124
The theme of excessive costs was sounded time and time again in the
submissions to the EDPB. Danish entrepreneurs argued that the EDPB’s
supplemental measures “fail to acknowledge the reality of startups,” which “simply
are not be able to afford” to conduct “a detailed analysis of the characteristics of
every transfer and an assessment of all applicable local laws requiring specialist
multi-jurisdictional legal advice.”125 This trade organization continued, “In practice,
this would prohibit start-ups and scale-ups from relying on many global service
providers ….”126 A Spanish digital industry association worried that the rules “will
require EU organisations to undertake their own costly analyses of the laws and
practices of dozens of non-EU countries (i.e., those not subject to an EU adequacy

European Data Protection Board, Recommendations 01/2020 on measures that supplement transfer tools to
ensure compliance with the EU level of protection of personal data, https://edpb.europa.eu/our-worktools/documents/public-consultations/2020/recommendations-012020-measures-supplement_en.
123
ACT/The
App
Association,
Comment
R01/2020-0013
(Nov.
30,
2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/webform/public_consultation_reply/act-feedback-edpbdata-transfer-recommendations.pdf.
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decision), which will be unrealistic for most small and medium-sized enterprises,
research institutions, and others.”127
The EDPB responded to the comments by slightly modifying its rules.128
These modifications generally do not lessen the harms that the companies feared.
Indeed, the greatest concession of the EU regulators was to make it clear that the
exporter could consider in its risk assessment “the practical experience of the
importer, among other elements and with certain caveats.”129 The risk assessment
itself requires the exporter to consider “the laws and practices applicable to the
importer and the data transferred,” including no fewer than eleven possible sources,
including caselaw of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights; adequacy
decisions in the country of destination; resolution and reports from
intergovernmental organizations; national case-law or decisions taken by
administrative authorities; and “[r]eports based on practical experience with prior
instances of requests for disclosures from public authorities.”130 It is difficult to
imagine how any entity other than the largest resource-rich organizations will be
able to comply with these requirements.
II. BEYOND THE BRACKET: EMERGING APPROACHES
The decision at the dawn of the internet age to bracket privacy in the modern
trade order set the stage for the privacy or trade crisis that we face today. Part I of
this Article demonstrated that while cross-border data flows are widely
acknowledged as essential to contemporary trade, data privacy law has led to a
splintering of the important adequacy norm for transfers, a regulatory thicket, and
harm to SMEs and the developing world.
This Part turns to the emerging responses to this crisis and identifies three
major approaches to the privacy-trade conflict. Jagdish Bhagwati, one of the world’s
most distinguished trade economists, has described the emergence of bilateral and
regional free trade agreements as creating a “spaghetti bowl” of “criss-crossing”
trade rules with complicated rules of origin and complex sets of obligations.131 This
metaphor seems apt as well for the emerging data trade order. There are now
different types of pasta in the spaghetti bowl of contemporary trade agreements. A
nation typically does not adopt a single solution to the question of “privacy and/or
trade,” but accepts a range of different approaches as reflected in its own crisscrossing obligations.
AMETIC,
Comment
R01/2020-0012
(Nov.
30
2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/webform/public_consultation_reply/ametic_edpb_guida
nce_nov2020_vfinal.pdf.
128 For an explanation of the changes, see DLA Piper, EDPB adopts final Recommendations on Supplementary
Measures (June 23, 2021), PRIVACY MATTERS, https://blogs.dlapiper.com/privacymatters/edpb-adoptfinal-recommendations-on-supplementary-measures/.
129 European Data Protection Board, EDPB Adopts Final Version of Recommendations on Supplementary
Measures (June 21, 2021), https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2021/edpb-adopts-final-versionrecommendations-supplementary-measures-letter-eu_en.
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Part II begins with the U.S. model, which favors trade over privacy, and then
turns to the European model, which prioritizes privacy over trade. This Part then
shows the emergence of a third model, a kind of escape valve, upon which both the
U.S. and the EU have converged. In the United States and the European Union,
accountability mechanisms permit private-sector organizations to accept certain
established data privacy standards. The result is to release pressure that each
system’s predominant regulatory approach creates within international economic
relations. These opt-in mechanisms allow recourse to second-best solutions that
distribute decision-making power among a diverse set of institutions.
A. Trade Before Privacy
Given a choice, the United States would have the world regulate data privacy
through national law and create bilateral and regional agreements that favor data
flow. In various agreements, such as the United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement
(USMCA), it has expressed this policy preference.
1. The Model in a Nutshell
The approach of the United States to data trade consists of three essential
elements. First, it prioritizes the free flow of data across borders, and does so by
seeking binding trade rules promoting cross-border data flows. Second, the United
States generally prefers national rather than international approaches to data
privacy. In effect, the United States seeks globalized rules for trade, but national
rules for privacy. Third, the United States requires that privacy rules in other
countries that interfere with the free flow of data across borders be strictly justified.
This dynamic inevitably creates conflict among nations, for which the United States
makes use of opt-in agreements to meet the demands of national privacy law.
2. Elements of the U.S. Model
As we have seen, since the 1980s, the United States, worried that national
restrictions on data would imperil its multinational corporations, has sought to
ensure the cross-border flow of data. Accordingly, it subjects such national data
rules to international trade law disciplines. Here is the first element of its model: the
United States seeks international trade agreements that protect cross-border data
flows.
This story begins with the U.S. role in shaping GATS. The United States was
willing to have GATS recognize the importance of privacy, but also wished it to
limit privacy measures to keep them from unduly restricting trade.132 The result was
a stopgap, namely, the compromise that this Article terms the “Privacy Bracket.”
Left to its own devices, however, the United States sought to establish the primacy
of trade over privacy in a series of bilateral and regional trade agreements. The U.S.
set in place explicit protections for cross-border data flows in its trade agreements.
132
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These began with a requirement to “refrain from . . . unnecessary barriers to
electronic information flows across borders” in the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement.133 As a further example, before withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, the United States negotiated a robust set of rules favoring data flows,
which were adopted by the remaining parties as part of the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (the “CPTPP”).134
Second, the United States does not seek to globalize privacy standards, but to
encourage national solutions. As the United States is the great international outlier
in its legal system for data privacy, a globalization of norms in this area would likely
work to heighten Europe’s influence and favor its own framework. Where most of
the rest of the world has enacted overarching data protection statutes, bolstered in
places by narrower sectoral laws, the United States remains committed to its
sectoral, patchwork approach—at least at the federal level.135 In addition, the
establishment of independent, national data protection commissioners, a
cornerstone of the approach in the European Union, is now common from Austria
to Zambia. The United States lacks any such national authority.136 For example, the
CPTPP introduces a requirement that each party maintain a legal framework for
the protection of personal information, but adds a footnote, one clearly drafted by
U.S. negotiators, that explains that a country can satisfy that requirement through
“sector-specific laws covering privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement of
voluntary undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy.”137
Third, the United States has sought to ensure that privacy measures that would
limit the flow of personal data be strictly justified. To be sure, this requirement is,
at least in theory, found in GATS. Article XIV(c)(ii) of that treaty requires traderestrictive measures, such as ones protecting privacy, to be “necessary.”This
language is much ignored, however, and it has been left to the United States to
devise ways to increase the efficacy of an orientation around “necessity.”
With the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020, the
United States found a way to do so. Here, the United States implemented the
strongest currently existing version of a free-flow commitment. This free trade
agreement is the first in the world to contain a “digital trade” chapter. Under it, no
party can restrict the transfer of personal information across borders, unless such a
restriction is necessary for a legitimate public purpose; not applied in a

Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, art. 15.8,
June 30, 2007, modified, Dec. 5, 2010.
134 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, arts. 14.11, 14.13, Mar.
8, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP]. The other eleven negotiating states adopted the free flow provisions in
the final text of the CPTPP, which was the first treaty “to explicitly restrict the use of data localization
measures.” Burri, supra note 38, at 71.
135 See generally Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy, 105
MINN. L. REV. 1733 (2021).
136 For a call for a federal privacy agency in the United States, see Robert Gellman, A Better Way to
Approach Privacy Policy in the United States, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183 (2003).
137 CPTPP, supra note 135, art. 14.8, n.6.
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discriminatory manner; and not more restrictive than necessary for that purpose.138
As Svetlana Yakovleva points out, the USMCA is building in obligations that
normalize privacy measures “as tools of international trade” and to view them as
“trade values” rather than human rights.139 A deeper look at the USMCA is merited
at this juncture because this type of agreement represents the future if the United
States gets its way.
The USMCA achieves its goals first by making it clear that it considers
information privacy as a category of consumer protection law. Fittingly for this
vision, it places its provisions about “Personal Information Protection” immediately
after those for “Online Consumer Protection.”140 It begins its privacy section by
stating that the parties to the agreement “recognize the economic and social benefits
of protecting the personal information of users of digital trade and the contribution
that this makes to enhancing consumer confidence in digital trade.”141 This
language is true to the U.S. paradigm that information privacy law serves to
safeguard the individual as a consumer in the data marketplace.142
The Treaty’s next step is to require the establishment of a legal framework for
the protection of the personal information. It sets out certain key principles that the
required data privacy framework must contain. In particular, the USMCA references
the APEC Privacy Framework and the OECD Guidelines on Privacy. Yaklovleva
rightly observes that these two international documents embody “the economic
approach to the protection of personal data as a precondition for digital trade.”143
The USMCA also makes clear that each country may devise its own data
privacy rules. There are to be many rooms in the global house of privacy. The goal
is not the uniformity of data privacy law, but interoperability of different regimes.
As the USMCA states, “Recognizing that Parties may take different legal
approaches to protecting personal information, each Party should encourage the
development of mechanisms to promote compatibility between these different
regimes.”144 This language is reminiscent of a project of United States corporate
interests in the early part of the 21st Century to re-orient international privacy law
around concepts of “interoperability” and “accountability.”145 The Global
Accountability Project’s 2009 Galway Paper, for example, sought to shift
governance to individual organizations and to make it “a mechanism for global
governance of data.”146 And “interoperability” was a key goal of the Obama
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement art. 19:11, Nov. 30, 2018, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE [hereinafter USMCA].
139 Yakoleva, Privacy Protection(ism), 74 U. MIAMI L.REV. 416, 492 (2020).
140 USMCA, supra note 140, arts. 19.7–19.8.
141 Id. at art. 19.8.
142 Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 147-49 (2017).
143 Yakoleva, Privacy Protection(ism), supra note 141, at 492.
144 USMCA, supra note 140, art. 19.8.
145 Centre Testifies at ITC Hearing on Privacy as a Trade Barrier, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH (Mar. 7, 2013),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2013/03/07/centre-testifies-at-itc-hearing-on-privacy-as-atrade-barrier/.
146 CENTRE FOR INFORMATION POLICY LEADERSHIP, DATA PROTECTION ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 1 (2009).
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Administration. Its 2012 report on “Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked
World” called for engagement among “international partners to create greater
interoperability among our respective privacy frameworks.”147 This report begins
with the observation that “governments may take different approaches” to
“[c]onsumer data privacy frameworks.”148
The difficulty with different approaches, however, is that one nation may find
a foreign nation’s privacy framework to be lacking, or, “inadequate.” If each country
devises its own data privacy rules, it is inevitable that countries will seek mechanisms
to protect personal data as it flows abroad. The United States seeks to resolve
possible tensions among these myriad approaches by allowing recourse to opt-in
accountability mechanisms at the organizational level—as we discuss in the third
model below. For example, the USMCA commits to recognize the APEC CrossBorder Privacy Rules (CBPR) as a sufficient safeguard for the cross-border flow of
personal information.149 Before exploring this system, this Article first turns to the
European Union’s model for global data exchanges.
B. Privacy Before Trade
The European Union would have the world favor data privacy over trade. But
in various trade agreements and policy instruments, it has also sought to advance
global data flows and, as a practical matter, increasingly engaged in a coordination
of privacy and trade negotiations.
1. The Model in a Nutshell
The European Union’s approach to international exchanges of personal data
consists of three essential elements. First, in the European Union, privacy
represents a higher value than trade in data. Foundational documents of the
European Union safeguard data protection as a fundamental right, and the CJEU
vigorously enforces it. Second, at the same time as the European Union views
privacy as a human right, it has sought to promote the free flow of personal data. It
has developed the idea of “adequacy” as the essential substantive concept for
deciding when personal information may leave the territory of the European
Economic Area. But, as in the United States, the European Union permits the use
of opt-in accountability mechanisms as an escape valve. Third, the European Union
continues to maintain the ideology of the Bracket but, in practice, is coordinating
its privacy and trade negotiations and doing so to heighten its influence.

THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD i–ii (2012).
Id. at 31.
149 USMCA, supra note 140, art. 19.8.
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2. Elements of the EU Model
The first element of the European Union’s model for transborder exchanges
of personal data is its bedrock concept that privacy is a human right. Global
transfers cannot undermine this right. As the GDPR declares in its first recital, “The
protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a
fundamental right.”150 A later recital confirms the desire to “further facilitate the
free flow of personal data within the Union and the transfer to third countries and
international organizations,” but only “while ensuring a high level of the protection
of personal data.”151 The constitutional status of data protection and privacy in the
EU is made explicit in two of its foundational documents, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).152
While the European Union emphasizes the fundamental nature of the right to
privacy, it has also sought to promote the global exchange of personal information.
Thus, the second element of the EU model for data trade begins with a firm
recognition of the economic value of information, which then leads to its
“adequacy” approach. The European Union seeks to combine economic
liberalization of personal data trade with harmonized policies to protect data
privacy. A key early document in this regard was the Data Protection Directive
(1995), which articulates its goals as (1) facilitating the free flow of personal data
within the European Union; and (2) ensuring an equally high level of protection
within all EU countries for “the fundamental rights and freedom of natural persons,
and in particular their right to privacy.”153 The goal, one further developed through
enactment of the GDPR, is to promote the free flow of personal data within the
territory of the European Union by requiring a similarly high standard of data
protection for all EU member states. Hence, should personal information be
transferred from France to Italy to Germany to Portugal, the data would be subject
to the same rigorous rules.
When it came to transfers outside of its borders, the European Union has long
sought protection that follows personal data. Globalization of data flows required
an international reach for EU data protection law. As Spiros Simitis, an academic
celebrated as a founder of European privacy law, stated, “Data protection does not
stop at national borders.”154 And this policy imperative brings us to the adequacy
idea. This Article has already described the widespread international adoption of the
GDPR, supra note 82, Recital 1.
Id. at Recital 6. A later recital in the GDPR, Recital 101, explicitly references the value of
transnational exchanges of personal data. It states, “Flows of personal data to and from countries
outside the Union . . . are necessary for the expansion of international trade and international
cooperation.” Yet, these transfers should not be at the cost of “the level” of data protection “ensured
in the Union.”
152 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8(1), Dec. 12, 2000, 2000 O.J. C 364/01
[hereinafter Charter]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 16(1), 2010 O.J. C 83/47.
153 Council Directive 95/46, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC).
154 Spiros Simitis, Einleitung: Geschichte — Ziele — Prinzipien [Introduction: History —
Goals — Principles], in KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ [COMMENTARY ON THE
FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION LAW] 125 (Spiros Simitis ed., 7th ed. 2011).
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European Union’s idea of adequacy; the process for achieving a formal adequacy
decision from the Union; and the international splintering of this concept with more
than sixty countries outside of the European Union and EFTA adopting their own
adequacy regimes. For the European Union, however, adequacy became a core
principle for permitting trade in personal data as part of its protection of data
privacy. Having achieved harmonized data protection within the territory of the
European Union, it sought to prevent personal information from flowing to
countries outside its borders with insufficient protection. The answer was to require
these so-called “third countries” to have (at least) “adequate” protection.
Once adequacy was developed as the key EU standard, a policy debate ensued
regarding whether this term indicated that non-EU countries might be permitted to
have a lesser level of data privacy and still be eligible to receive personal data from
EU member states.155 And, as noted earlier in this Article, the CJEU decisively
answered this question on two occasions. In its pathbreaking decisions in Schrems I
and Schrems II, it ruled that adequacy required no less than “essentially equivalent”
levels of data protection between the European Union and third country.156 Thus,
the EU Model, its spaghetti bowl, contains policy elements that favor privacy over
trade. Data privacy has a normative backstop of an explicit constitutional status in
the European Union, and an institutional backstop in the form of a high court, the
CJEU, eager to promote and enhance it.
There is also an escape valve for the EU model and its orientation around
trade before privacy. In particular, the European Union has long been skeptical of
the far different approach to data privacy in the United States. These include matters
such as the lack of an omnibus, or overarching statute, and the absence of a human
rights status for the privacy of personal information. The solution has been to
negotiate opt-in standards for U.S. companies who wish to receive data transfers
for Europe. We discuss these accountability mechanisms in the following section.
The third and final element in the EU model is an increasing coordination of
trade and privacy efforts. Officially, the EU claims to keep a wall between its trade
policies and privacy protection. As the Commission stated in 2017, “[T]he
protection of personal data is non-negotiable in trade agreements.”157 Following its
adequacy decision for Japan, the Commission loftily observed, “For the EU, privacy
is not a commodity to be traded. Dialogues on data protection and trade
negotiations with third countries have to follow separate tracks.”158 In practice, the
European Union has launched adequacy negotiations contemporaneously with
trade negotiations. The EU-Japan adequacy agreement was negotiated
simultaneously with negotiations for the EU-Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement. The Commission adopted the adequacy decision on January 23, 2019
Id.
Schrems I, supra note 1, at ¶¶. 73-74, 96; Schrems II, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 8, 96.
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and the Economic Partnership Agreement on February 1, 2019 in a one-two
demonstration of syncing up the two matters.159
Crucially, the data trade negotiations between the EU and Japan have now led
to the world’s first mutual adequacy agreement. Both countries recognize each other
as providing an equivalent level of protection for personal data. Announcing the
mutual adequacy decisions, the Commission heralded “the world’s largest area of
safe transfers of data,” with extensive references to the economic benefits that
would flow accordingly, including “privileged access [for European companies] to
the 127 million Japanese consumers.”160
The coordination of these negotiations around trade and privacy, while
maintaining formal separation, also illustrates a larger point, which is that adequacy
findings have always contained a political element. Already in 2013, Christopher
Kuner noted the difficulty of passing judgment “on a foreign regulatory system
without political considerations playing some role.”161 Indeed, the Commission
itself has acknowledged the instrumental nature of its process for selecting third
countries for “a dialogue” on adequacy. In a 2017 white paper setting out its goals
in this regard, the very first consideration focuses on trade, namely, “the extent of
the EU’s (actual or potential) commercial relations with a given third country,
including the existence of a free trade agreement or ongoing negotiations.”162 The
white paper also points to “the overall political relationship with the third country
in question, in particular with respect to the promotion of common values and
shared objectives at international level.”163 A final factor makes clear the European
Union’s goal of promoting widespread adoption of its policy balance; it will consider
“the pioneering role the third country plays in the field of privacy and data
protection” and whether this country “could serve as a model for other countries
in its region.”164 Thus, in opening adequacy discussions, the European Union seeks
to expand both its commercial relations with other countries and the influence of
its regime for privacy protection.
C. The Escape Valve: Opting in to Privacy Accountability
In a notable convergence around a common policy, the United States and the
European Union agreed, separately and jointly, on the need to find a way a way to
avoid potentially disastrous outcomes. The bad result would be world regulatory
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systems causing a significant blockage of global data exchanges. The result has been
the creation of an escape valve in the form of accountability mechanisms.
1. The Model in a Nutshell
Because both the United States and the European Union have trading partners
that do not follow their model for trade and privacy, they both provide
accountability mechanisms as a private alternative to broader legal mandates. Such
accountability mechanisms permit organizations to opt-in to a binding program
overseen by an accountability agent. As is typical of the spaghetti bowl of trade and
privacy law, there are multiple variations in the elements of accountability
mechanisms.
2. Elements of an Accountability Model
Privacy accountability mechanisms supply an organizationally-based approach
to transborder data transfers that private and public authorities then reinforce.
Christopher Kuner explains that determinations of the permissibility of transfers
can be geographically-based or organizationally-based.165 The classic example of
geographically based scrutiny is the European Union’s top-down scrutiny of
whether a third country meets its adequacy standard. In contrast, organizationallybased approaches begin with top-down approval of a set of requirements. A data
processing organization can then choose to opt-in to these requirements and follow
them regarding transferred personal data. Finally, there is typically an accountability
agent that checks on whether these rules are in fact followed. We turn now to how
the United States has approached the use of privacy accountability; how the
European Union has done so; and how their joint use of this approach has fared.
a. The U.S. Escape Valve: APEC
The classic example of a U.S.-promoted accountability mechanism is the
Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CPBR) system, established in 2011 by the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC).166 The initial step in the development of the
APEC Data Trade Model was the APEC Privacy Framework (2005), which like the
OECD Guidelines, is a classic example of soft law. Thus, it is an instrument that is
not directly binding, but that yet creates expectations about future conduct. The
resulting “[o]bligations are, to a large extent, in the eye of the beholder.”167
The APEC Framework consists of nine principles, which are themselves based
on an earlier example of privacy soft law, namely the OECD Guidelines. Both the
OECD Privacy Guidelines and the APEC Privacy Framework illustrate “something
more than a complete absence of commitment, but something less than full-blown
KUNER, supra note 163, at 64–76.
APEC, APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System (updated Nov. 2019), http://cbprs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/4.-CBPR-Policies-Rules-and-Guidelines-Revised-For-Posting-3-16updated-1709-2019.pdf [hereinafter CBPR].
167 Guzman & Meyer, supra note 47, at 174..
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international law.”168 Both are best understood in the Guzman-Meyer sense as
coordinating devices. The APEC and OECD lack the power to generate hard law,
but can assist countries in generating a focal point where convergence on a policy
solution is possible.
APEC developed its CBPR as a mechanism to harden the soft law approach
of the Privacy Principles. The CBPR explicitly states, “Nothing is this document is
intended to create binding international obligations, affect existing obligations
under international or domestic law, or create obligations under the law and
regulations of APEC Economies.”169 But the CBPR permits APEC member
economies to participate in a system that allows individual companies to agree to a
binding set of rules. As Guzman and Meyer point out, soft law should be viewed as
a continuum. The CPBR builds on the softer law of the APEC Privacy Principles
by creating an opt-in to harder principles.
The purpose of the CBPR system is to permit organizations engaged in global
data trade to demonstrate their commitment to privacy and security. In setting up
the CBPR, APEC member economies agreed on a formulation that lowers
transaction costs for organizations by providing pre-approved principles that would
smooth the process of international data transfers. Yet, thus far only nine of the
twenty-one APEC economies have entered into the CBPR System.170 And this step
by itself creates no obligations on any company in these territories; it only opens
the door for their participation in a comprehensive privacy certification system.
Companies seeking CBPR certification must apply to a recognized APEC
“accountability agent,” which each country that joins the CBPR system is required
to designate.171 These are private-sector organizations. A company must select an
accountability agent within the participating APEC economy in which it is
“primarily located.”172 The agent evaluates the company according to a list of fifty
privacy requirements that further operationalize the nine APEC privacy principles.
Companies that meet these requirements are then certified as in compliance with
the CBPR. If companies fail to comply with their certification, the first step for
enforcement is with the accountability agent.173 A certification is also legally
enforceable by the “Privacy Enforcement Authority” (PEA) in the economy in

Id. at 180.
CBPR, supra note 168, at 1.
170 Government, CROSS BORDER PRIVACY RULES SYSTEM, http://cbprs.org/government/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2022) (listing the nine currently participating economies: Mexico, the United States, Canada,
Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, Chinese Taipei and the Philippines).
171 CBPR, supra note 168, at 3–4.
172 In the United States, the four approved accountability agents are BBB National Programs, TrustArc,
Schellman, and the NCC group. Office of Digital Service Industries, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.trade.gov/about-us/office-digital-services-industries.
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which the company is certified.174 In the United States, the Federal Trade
Commission is the PEA.175
The APEC CBPR system has been seen as setting weaker standards than those
imposed by European law. Lee Bygrave concludes that it offers standards that “are
generally lower than those found” in European laws, and that it is “an instrument
with a mild prescriptive bite.”176 Moreover, many of the Framework’s principles are
subject to broad exceptions. Thus far, “the only enforcement actions taken by the
FTC were against three companies falsely claiming to be CBPR certified.”177
b. The EU Escape Valve: SCCs and BCRs
Like the United States, the European Union has developed ways to permit
organizations to agree to pre-negotiated binding standards for data trade to meet an
acceptable level of privacy. This is necessary because, as we have seen, the European
Commission has found so little of the world outside Europe to have “adequate”
data protection law. As Joel Reidenberg predicted in 2000, “If [EU] data protection
is taken seriously, then systemic legal conflicts should cause disruption of
international data flows.”178 Accountability mechanisms offer a means to avoid such
disruption by permitting organizations in jurisdictions not deemed adequate to
voluntarily follow EU-approved data handling practices.
The key mechanisms in this regard are the Standard Contractual Clauses
(SCCs) and Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs).179 The SCCs simplify the process of
crafting data transfer agreements. Rather than using attorneys to draft contracts
from scratch and then seek EU approval, a company can adopt the model
contractual clauses and use their “off-the-rack” language, which the European
Union wrote to provide “adequate” protection. If there are any deviations to the
exact language of the SCC, each member state from which data will be transferred
must grant approval to the revised contractual agreement.
BCRs offer another mechanism by which to engage in data transfers to
countries not declared adequate, but only within a single company or a group of
affiliated companies. BCRs require that an organization promise to follow certain
broadly defined procedures; cooperate with EU data protection authorities; and

Id.
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receive approval from a “lead” data protection authority.180 Lothar Determann, a
leading international privacy lawyer, warns, “The greatest administrative burden has
been associated with implementing Binding Corporate Rules.”181 The difficulty
follows because there is no official template, but only guidance as to the necessary
internal corporate rules.
In its SCCs and BCRs, the European Union characteristically behaves in a
rigorous fashion. The SCCs and BCRs are not lenient instruments by any stretch,
but stringent attempts, even within the context of an escape valve, to emphasize
privacy over trade. The resulting frameworks are also highly intricate, with the
promise of nearly limitless work for attorneys and significant compliance burdens
for their clients. For example, Determann warns that SCCs become highly complex
when a data exchange involves a so-called “onward transfer,” such as those
involving “external service providers, business partners, [and] government agencies
(e.g. in the case of investigations, litigation or reporting obligations).”182 When such
transferred information is to be shared further, it “can be difficult or impossible”
for the initial transferee to use SCC terms verbatim with the onward transferee. 183
Examples include when data is sought as part of pre-trial discovery, when a foreign
government is carrying out an investigation, or when a company is dealing with
business partners who do not wish to follow EU data protection law.184
The American and European accountability mechanisms also differ in their
types of oversight. As we have seen, the United States relies on a mixture of private
sector and governmental oversight of the CBPRs, but there has not been a
significant number of enforcement actions thus far. In Europe, in contrast, SCCs
and BCRs are policed in the first instance by national Data Protection Authorities.
These two mechanisms are also subject to CJEU scrutiny for their compliance with
constitutional requirements for privacy. Moreover, there has been considerable
attention to the form of the SCCs and BCRs from EU institutions, including the
Commission. In 2021, the Commission approved a revised set of SCCs, including
the requirement of a new set of supplementary measures in response to CJEU
concerns over about U.S. national security surveillance.185 A recommendation of
the European Data Protection Board has pointed to the use of encryption as one
such supplemental measure.186
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c. The Shared Escape Valve: The Safe Harbor, Privacy Shield, and Beyond
The United States and European Union have also collaborated on common
accountability mechanisms in the Safe Harbor (2000) and the Privacy Shield
(2016).187 Faced with notable differences between their two kinds of data privacy
law, the European Union, acting through the Commission, and the United States,
acting through the Commerce Department, negotiated the elements of these two
successive self-certification programs. These were mixtures of EU-U.S. standards
with each agreement edging closer to the EU version of data privacy norms. In each
instance, however, the CJEU identified fatal constitutional flaws in the resulting
mechanism and invalidated it. Nonetheless, each jurisdiction recognizes the
necessity of such an escape valve, which is demonstrated by the ongoing
negotiations between the Commission and the Commerce Department to devise a
Privacy Shield 2.0.
How have these shared EU-U.S. escape valves functioned? The basic model
is to have U.S. companies agree to follow a core set of privacy standards for
personal data transferred from the European Union. Companies self-certified
adherence to the announced standards and then attested in an online public registry
that they have conducted a self-assessment. Compliance with the standards was
overseen by U.S. federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission.
In Schrems I, the CJEU invalidated the Safe Harbor because of two concerns.
Its first was that the agreement swept too far in permitting the United States
government to access personal information transferred from the European Union.
Its second was a concern regarding the “one and done” nature of the Commission’s
adequacy finding for the Safe Harbor. The CJEU stated, “[I]t is incumbent upon
the Commission … to check periodically whether the finding relating to the
adequacy of the level of protection ensured by the third country in question is still
factually and legally justified.”188
The Privacy Shield responded to these CJEU concerns in three ways.189 It
offered concrete commitments about data privacy from the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence; established a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson in the State
Department to respond to EU individual complaints about national security
surveillance; and created mechanisms for the Commission to review its adequacy
finding.190 The Privacy Shield survived two annual EU-U.S. joint reviews before the
CJEU found it did not supply an “essentially equivalent level” of protection for
transferred data as that provided within the European Union.191 The EU High
U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (last updated Jan.
30,
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Court criticized a lack of limits on the scope of bulk collection of personal data; an
absence of effective remedies for EU data subjects, including the inability to bring
an enforcement action before an independent court; and the insufficiency of the
ombudsperson mechanism.192
A chief lesson from this saga is an institutional one, and one that is applicable
for all of the accountability mechanisms surveyed. These escape valves are secondbest solutions: both the European Union and United States would prefer that other
jurisdictions follow their respective mixtures regarding trade and privacy. The
shared solution is to allow organizations to opt-in to a general set of principles and
then to turn to accountability agents for oversight. The result distributes decisionmaking power among different institutions. In the case of the European Union, the
most powerful of these has been the CJEU, which has not hesitated to void
successive EU-U.S. agreements. In the case of the United States, enforcement,
whether under the APEC CPBR, or the Safe Harbor and then the Privacy Shield,
has proven less intense. The Federal Trade Commission approached its
enforcement of the Privacy Shield largely as an “add-on” claim against companies
that had also violated U.S. privacy law, including a claim against Cambridge
Analytica, or in straightforward cases against companies that claimed on their
websites to be participating in the Privacy Shield, but had failed to register as
required on the online public registry.193
III. TOWARDS PRIVACY AND TRADE
Privacy and free trade need not be in mortal opposition. In fact, in our view,
privacy should be incorporated into an ambitious new world trade treaty. This Part
develops a vision for a Global Privacy Agreement, and sets out its normative
foundation. We recognize that others may favor different policy approaches, and
therefore discuss alternative solutions to the current crisis.
A. Normative Considerations
In the scholarly literature concerning global data transfers, those who favor
privacy share certain presuppositions about the underpinnings of the regime for
world trade. These authors perceive a dichotomy between neo-liberal freemarketers (the advocates of trade) and privacy defenders (the protectors of human
rights). Setting up the issue in this fashion preordains a conclusion that privacy is
Id.
See FTC Issues Opinion and Order Aganst Cambridge Analytica, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 6,
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-issues-opinion-order-againstcambridge-analytica-deceiving; FTC Takes Action against Companies Falsely Claiming Compliance with the EUU.S. Privacy Shield, Other International Privacy Agreements, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (June 14, 2019),
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inevitably to be favored over trade. Yet, there are other normative visions of
international trade beyond neo-liberalism, and ones that will enrich the policy
discussion in this area. This section presents an interpretation of the values present
in trade and in privacy and locate a shared commitment to opportunity and
democratic self-rule in each.
1. The Value of Trade
In a demonstration of the standard dichotomy, Svetlana Yakovleva sees free
trade as centered on promoting “efficiency gains” and “maximization of wealth,”
while data privacy rests on human dignity and autonomy.194 In addition, its
protection is “a matter of social justice.”195 While the digital single market matters,
privacy “will always prevail” as a value for the European Union because of the
constitutional status of data protection in the EU Charter and other fundamental
EU documents.196 In her view, “Simply put, by labelling certain domestic policies
such as restrictions on cross-border data flows and data localization measures as
digital protectionism, it is much easier to critique them, reject them, and put
competing policy interests such as privacy, data protection, or industrial policy in a
subordinate position.”197
We agree with Yakovleva that the conflict between privacy and trade raises
questions about values. However, there are other principles associated with trade
beyond efficiency and wealth-maximization. In particular, trade rules can support
the development of human capital across the world. Cross-border trade in services
means a democratization of opportunity throughout the world. Here, we wish to
build on the vision of Louis Brandeis regarding the value of business.
While scholars are likely to remember Brandeis for his pathbreaking
development of privacy as a “right to be let alone,” his views about business are
equally foundational parts of his intellectual legacy.198 Brandeis cared deeply about
the relationship between economic opportunity and political freedom. As he
testified before the Senate in 1913, “You cannot have true American citizenship,
you cannot preserve political liberty, you cannot secure American standards of
living unless some degree of industrial liberty accompanies it.”199 Pointing to the
impact of industrial democracy and using the gendered language typical of the time,
Brandeis argued that “the facilities of men will be liberated and developed” only if
the tyranny of the “money kings” ended.200 Brandeis worried about massive
concentration of wealth and warned that vast family fortunes were “inconsistent
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with democracy.”201 He believed that the democratization of opportunity would
make for better citizens.
From today’s perspective, Brandeis identified a set of critical concerns about
the impact of business on social structure and the need for legal attention to this
area. In thinking about how individual opportunity relates to political freedom,
Brandeis had an unshakeable belief that free and open markets benefited
democracy.202 In a largely skeptical account of Brandeis’ economic assumptions,
Thomas K. McCraw nonetheless concedes that he was asking the right question,
“How, in an age of big business, could the government preserve American
democratic values?”203
Brandeisian concerns are present as well in the modern promotion of
international trade.204 Indeed, trade opens markets to broader competition.
Consider the role of digital trade within the European Union. Through its “digital
single market” initiative, the European Union has made clear that removing barriers
to online goods and services across Europe is about more than economic
prosperity. In terms that would resonate with Brandeis, European Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen, stated, “This digital Europe should reflect the best
of Europe - open, fair, diverse, democratic, and confident.”205 Fair access to data
creates fair opportunity for people and organizations, “whether public or private,
big or small, start up or giant.”206
Both within the EU and on a global scale, the issue of trade implicates
distributive justice. This point is especially urgent today as the developing world
seeks to enter into valuable markets for digital services. The internet offers the
revolutionary possibility of allowing workers in the Global South to provide services
to consumers and businesses in the Global North. The promise for the Global
South includes offering high value business processes, from data analysis to
engineering. As one of us has written, “Services now join goods in the global
marketplace, with workers in developing countries able to participate in lucrative
Western markets despite immigration barriers.”207 The internet allows these
workers to jump the borders dividing North and South. If we effectively ban the
Global South from being able to access or process data about persons in the Global
North, workers and companies in the Global South will be denied the opportunities
Id. at 64.
MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 326 (2009).
203 THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 109 (1984). Moreover, Brandeis called for legal
actions to promote the right structure for business and block the worst ones, such as oligarchical
financial entities swapping in shadowy high-risk instruments. Id. In this regard, Brandeis anticipated the
threat of “Too Big to Fail” investment banks and the need for the kinds of reforms expressed in the
Dodd-Frank Act (2010). JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 82 (2016).
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that Brandeis would have cheered. Banning the movement of data overseas is to
create barriers that divide nations in the virtual world.
2. The Value of Privacy
Like trade, privacy is a concept with many dimensions. In the European
Union, data protection is a distinct and fundamental right protected by Article 8 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.208 It is also bolstered by constitutional
protection for the “right to respect of private life,” as anchored in Article 7 of the
Charter.209 These rights matter because European data protection law seeks to
prevent risks to personhood caused by the processing of personal data. The
German Federal Constitutional Court has played a leading role in the European
conceptualization of data privacy. Its influential decisions in the Census case (1983)
and IT Privacy case (2008) center on how the processing of personal data can
threaten individual decisional authority and undermine “a free democratic
community based on its citizens’ capacity to act and participate.”210
The result is the concept of “a right to informational self-determination,” an
idea that European data privacy law has adopted.211 Here, too, a connection can be
made with the thought of Brandeis. In the careful interpretation of Neil Richards,
Brandeis’ key contribution is a conception of privacy as protecting “individual’s
emotional and intellectual processes so they can think for themselves.”212 Privacy is
about safeguarding “belief formation” and the producing of a “self-governing
citizenry.”213 Moreover, as this discussion shows, Yakovleva is correct to link
privacy to human dignity and autonomy. But there is also much more to be said
regarding privacy and how it relates to trade.
In particular, privacy and trade can serve related goals. Like privacy, trade can
further democratic self-rule. Just as privacy is about self-determination, the
international trade order seeks to assist global development and help empower
citizens of different countries. Moreover, data privacy alone is not of unalloyed
benefit to democratic community. The protection of privacy, even in the European
Union, is not a one-way ratchet working in favor of restrictions on flows to personal
data. As the German Federal Constitutional Court noted in its Census decision, “The
individual does not possess any absolute, unlimited mastery on ‘his’ data; rather, he

Charter, supra note 154, at Art. 8, 2007.
Id.
210 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 65 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (Dec. 15, 1983) (Census Case); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1 BvR 370/07 and 1 BvR 595/07 (Feb. 27, 2008) (IT Privacy
Case), at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20080227_1bvr037007.html.
211 For an early analysis of the right to information self-determination, see Paul M. Schwartz, The
Computer in German and American Constitutional Law, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675 (1989). For a discussion of
its influence, see Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 144, at 126.
212 Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1342 (2010).
213 Id. at 1323.
208
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is a personality … developing with the social community.”214 In its view, individuals
are “community-related and community-bound.”215
There are multiple values present when it comes to data privacy and
information flows. For example, the CJEU has decided numerous cases that explore
the need for limits on data protection rights when faced with other interests. 216
These cases assess the countervailing benefits present in law enforcement access to
telecommunications information; the public availability of search-engine
information; transparency interests in access to documents held by public
authorities; and other issues. When other interests collide with data protection
rights, the CJEU’s favored test is a proportionality analysis. Indeed, this concept is
a central one in EU law, enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter, which requires
that limitations on its “rights and freedoms” be “[s]ubject to the principle of
proportionality.”217
Moreover, there can be privacy-against-privacy trade-offs. The European
Union’s GDPR recognizes this issue when it comes to the age of consent for
children to data processing. As this Article has discussed, the GDPR lets member
states set this age between thirteen and sixteen years. In selecting an age, the
member state must decide the question of “Whose privacy?” danah boyd has
observed that the question of data privacy for children on the internet frequently
involves conflicts among multiple interests.218 Children are primarily concerned
with privacy from their parents while parents are worried about privacy from outside
parties. An EU member state that sets a lower age for consent does more to protect
children’s information seclusion as far as their parents are concerned, but less to
protect children from privacy violations by third parties. The opposite result occurs
in a member state that sets a higher age of consent.
3. Of Privacy and Bananas
From a certain perspective, trade and privacy must always be kept apart
because to do otherwise would be to subject a human right to economic
considerations. We have already quoted Spiros Simitis regarding the need for data
protection to continue beyond national borders. In 1994, Professor Simitis also
advised, “[D]ata protection may be a subject on which you can have different
answers to the various problems, but it is not a subject you can bargain about.” 219
More succinctly, he declared, “Privacy is not bananas.”220
Census case, supra note 215, at 35.
Id.
216 For a discussion, see EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 133-50 (2018).
217 Charter, supra note 154, at Art. 52(1). Under the text of Article 52(1), this requirement means that
“limitations must be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Id. For a discussion,
see HANDBOOK, supra note 221, at 46-48.
218 DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED 56 (2014).
219 Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 431, 439 (1995) (quoting Spiros Simitis) (Oct. 6, 1994).
220 Edmund L. Andrews, Europe and U.S. Are Still at Odds Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 1999).
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As it turns out, the European Union has itself over the last decade engaged in
a pattern of bargaining about privacy and trade. As this Article has shown, it has
employed different tactics with the United States (bilateral accountability
agreements) and with Japan and South Korea (multi-year adequacy negotiations).
The result has been a string of policy successes for the European Union. Linking
the two has not caused privacy to be subservient to trade, but led many countries
to establish or strengthen their data privacy law, often modeling it on EU models,
first the Data Protection Directive or, more recently, the GDPR. Also, as noted,
privacy and trade seem to have been connected, at least politically, in dealings
between the European Union and Japan and then with South Korea. For example,
the mutual adequacy decision between the EU and Japan was announced on January
23, 2019, just in time for the February 1, 2019 effective date of the EU-Japan free
trade agreement. In the aftermath of Brexit, moreover, the European Commission’s
ruling finding the United Kingdom adequate for data protection purposes came
within months of the conclusion of a new trade deal between the countries.221
To be sure, the flow of personal data across borders is different than the
transportation of bananas across oceans. As Svetlana Yakovleva and Kristina Irion
observe, “Personal data is peculiar in the way it combines the dignity of a human
being with economic properties valuable for commercial activity.”222 Bananas, after
all, do not carry our likes, dislikes, health status, and do not reveal where we were
last Saturday night. But the comparison requires more unpacking. Similar to trade
in services today, trade in bananas has long raised issues of global distributive
justice. At the time that Professor Simitis made his comparison, the WTO was
considering claims by ten banana-exporting Latin American nations that the
European Union’s import regime improperly discriminated between countries
based on colonial ties.223 This dispute was only settled in 2009 with the European
Union’s reform of its import system for bananas.224
In fact, bananas are exactly the kind of unprocessed export that developing
countries have long complained about as an example of trade injustice. There is also
a potential connection here with the crisis that has followed from the Privacy
Bracket. Due to the regulatory thicket, the splintering of adequacy, and the harm to
SMEs, data privacy law can become a hurdle to the growth of digital service
industries in the developing world. In over a quarter century of its regime for
international data transfers, the European Union has found only two developing
countries—Argentina and Uruguay—to have adequate privacy protection regimes.
The danger is of an international economic order where developing countries
export low value unprocessed goods while rich countries export high value finished
goods and services. Ever-increasing privacy hurdles run the risk of preserving

European Commission, Data protection: Commission adopts adequacy decisions for the UK (June 28, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3183
222 Yakovleva & Irion, Pitching, supra note 11, at 202.
223 For a summary of this complex dispute, see World Trade Organization, Lamy hails accord ending long
running
banana
dispute,
WTO.org
(Dec.
15,
2009),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr591_e.htm.
224 Id.
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higher value-added information-based digital services within the developed world
while confining the developing world to the sale of bananas.
We return now to the Privacy Bracket. GATS Article XIV permits countries
to take steps to protect data privacy. But where such privacy measures are used to
justify restrictions on trade that violate GATS obligations, this action must be
“necessary” and not a fig leaf to hide economic or political motives, such as
protectionism or favoritism for certain trading partners. In other words, while
privacy is a fundamental right in EU law, and trade is not, a restriction on a trade
measure is permissible only when privacy is the real motivation. In the language of
GATS, moreover, “necessity” means that there be no less-restrictive measure.
Taking this language seriously means that one must consider, for example, how data
privacy can be enhanced by trade. Just as keeping money in the bank is generally
safer than keeping it under the mattress, storing data in a world-class cloud system
is often safer than keeping data on one’s office computer. Moreover, a data
localization requirement means that a company might have to ensure cybersecurity
at multiple data centers in different countries.225 Privacy and trade need not be in
opposition to each other.
***
We turn now to three possible solutions to the current state of affairs and an
exploration of their benefits and costs. Our goal is to present a legal map of possible
resolutions of the trade versus privacy question. People may value trade and privacy
differently, and while we will share our own view as to the best way to proceed, we
acknowledge the validity of other preferences. In order of increasing magnitude of
the institutional effort involved, this Article points to three possible solutions:
muddling through without any coordinated international action; negotiating a
Global Data Privacy Enforcement Treaty; or, most ambitiously, enacting a Global
Data Privacy Agreement.
B. Solution 1: Muddling Through
With the Privacy Bracket still in place, nations will continue to develop their
own range of bilateral and regional arrangements. A triumph of incrementalism, this
approach continues the current tug of war between the European Union and the
United States with nations forced to pick sides or to somehow straddle the two.
Here are the likely results of muddling through in this context.
First, the European Union will leverage its adequacy mechanism. Some
nations will follow the recent path of Japan and South Korea to seek a formal
finding of adequacy from the Union. These countries will modify their laws and
perhaps offer special protections for data originating in the European Union.226 The
Commission will continue on the path of greater rigor and more demands in terms
Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677 (2015).
Japan amended its laws to provide special protections for data originating from the EU. See Data
Protection
Laws
of
the
World:
Japan,
DLA
Piper
(February
1,
2021),
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=transfer&c=JP.
225
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of required changes to national laws. The risk is that such incrementalism will place
formal adequacy findings out of reach for developing nations. As for the
organizational mechanisms for adequacy, the SCCs and BCRs, the European Union
will continue to refine and toughen them and will do so under the watchful eye of
the CJEU. Overall, the result will be heightened compliance costs, which will create
obstacles for less developed nations and SMEs as opposed to the developed world
and larger companies.
Second, the United States will seek to expand the influence for its policy
emphasis of trade before privacy. It is likely to develop new global trade
arrangements to further the international flow of data. As in the USMCA, the
United States will seek digital trade arrangements that consider privacy in consumer
protection terms and allow considerable leeway to countries to find their own path.
It will promote its APEC-CPBR, its favored opt-in accountability mechanism, and
seek to counterbalance the European Union’s stricter SCCs and BCRs.
Third, the two largest world economies, the United States and the European
Union, will revive and try to live under their own tailored accountability mechanism.
A Privacy Shield 2.0 is expected by the end of 2022, and will move the US
companies that choose to follow it closer to EU data protection standards. Under
Privacy Shield 2.0, U.S. companies will face heightened compliance costs in terms
of a new system for their self-certification while awaiting the inevitable case to the
CJEU challenging the new accord. The risk is that Privacy Shield 2.0 will meet the
same ignoble end before the CJEU as its predecessors, the Safe Harbor and Privacy
Shield.
Finally, the biggest cost of muddling through will be a continuing splintering
of the rules for trade and privacy. We have already seen how the adequacy concept,
after widespread global adoption and adaption, now lacks any uniform meaning.
There is not even shared agreement on this standard between the European Union
and the United Kingdom, which departed from the Union only in January 2020.
Indeed, after forty-seven years of EU membership, the United Kingdom lost no
time in developing its own unique variation on the adequacy mechanism.227
All and all, fans of data privacy might favor muddling through as a path to
promoting their favored value. In this assessment, the tug of war between the
European Union and the United States will lead to heightened influence for the
former and a loss of power for the latter. In other words, there may be more
Brussels Effect and less Pax Americana.228 But while some European businesses
may prosper because of protections against foreign suppliers, many more will be
harmed. For many European enterprises, their own efforts to transfer data from
foreign countries will be hampered by those other countries’ data protection laws.
Also likely is the emergence of distinct digital trade zones—one anchored by the
European Union, one by the United States, and even eventually one by China. The
The critical U.K. policy documents regarding adequacy were released on August 26, 2021, a little
less than eight weeks after the United Kingdom’s own adequacy finding from the European Union.
U.K. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, UK Approach to international data transfers (Aug. 26,
2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-approach-to-international-data-transfers.
228 For a masterful exploration of the influence of the European Union, see ANU BRADFORD, THE
BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE WORLD (2020).
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largest companies will manage to participate in multiple such zones. But the
possibility of a global internet and the fair development of a global trade in digital
services will seem a distant memory.
C. Solution 2: A Global Privacy Enforcement Treaty
A more ambitious undertaking would be to negotiate a treaty focused on
strengthening accountability mechanisms for cross-border data flows. As this
Article has shown, accountability mechanism are the voluntary devices that allow
corporations to commit to certain data privacy rules and thereby enable data
transfers between countries that have varying privacy regimes. These resulting rules
include those from the European Union (including SCCs and BCRs), those from
the United States (the APEC CBPR), and those negotiated between both (the
forthcoming successor to the Privacy Shield). A Global Privacy Enforcement Treaty
(GPET) would seek to put international law firmly behind accountability
mechanisms for data protection. Such an approach avoids having to reach global
agreement on substantive privacy norms, but goes beyond the current muddling
through approach.
A GPET would build on the current decentralized system for creating
accountability mechanisms. It would advance the call of Gregory Shaffer, made
over two decades ago, for mutual recognition among countries of different
approaches to transatlantic governance.229 It builds on this earlier work by
strengthening the enforcement tools available should a company fail to live up to
its agreements. The GPET responds to the risk that an accountability mechanism
alone cannot ensure enforcement in a distant land. What if the foreign data importer
falls short of its duties under the chosen mechanism, but the accountability agent
fails to enforce? Or what if there is enforcement, but the importer holds no assets
reachable by courts in the exporting jurisdiction? This issue is far from hypothetical.
As we have noted, there is concern that the APEC CBPR has led to a weak level of
enforcement. And the OECD has pointed to the challenge that privacy
enforcement authorities face in addressing cross-border cases and called for a
“more global and systemic approach” to enforcement cooperation.230
A GPET has the potential to strengthen data privacy accountability. Under
this treaty, signatory states would agree to enforce contractual safeguards created as
part of foreign and international data privacy law and then voluntarily agreed to by
domestic firms. The signatories would agree to collaborate on cross-border data
enforcement investigations. These countries would also agree to establish and
recognize accountability measures—such as recognizing some foreign SCCs as a
reasonable substitute, with perhaps a requirement for an additional submission for
a particular jurisdiction.
In some sense, the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor and then Privacy Shield have offered
a version of the GPET approach, albeit on a bilateral scale. These agreements
committed the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the Privacy Shield against
229
230
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companies that opted into the system. Similarly, the APEC CBPR requires that
member states have a Privacy Enforcement Authority to enforce the privacy
commitment of the corporations that commit to the system.
This global treaty might be part of the World Trade Organization, and
enforced via the WTO dispute settlement process. If the United States failed to
enforce accountability arrangements against a local company, for example, the
European Union could bring a challenge to the WTO. If its claim were successful,
the WTO could authorize the European Union to establish trade sanctions for that
failure, including the suspension of data transfers to that country.
GPET would offer a number of benefits, with few, if any, costs. By
strengthening accountability arrangements, more countries would trust crossborder data transfers. International coordination on privacy enforcement would
increase privacy compliance. Because accountability mechanisms are optional,
moreover, they would only impose costs on companies that found it worthwhile to
opt in. It is likely that a GPET would be especially useful to smaller, more resourceconstrained businesses.
D. Solution 3: The Global Agreement on Privacy
In 2000, Joel Reidenberg proposed a General Agreement on Information
Privacy within the WTO as a way to bridge the divide among countries on issues of
data privacy.231 This treaty would establish “an institutional process of norm
development designed to facilitate in the near term the coexistence of differing
regimes, and over time promote harmonization of governing standards for
information privacy.”232 Reidenberg did not develop this idea in any detail, however,
and did not return to his proposal before his untimely death in 2021. With his
writing on this topic as inspiration, we believe that it is time to revisit this idea. It is
now possible to develop a vision for a Global Agreement on Privacy (GAP) with
the benefit of a quarter-of-century of experience with the current data trade legal
regime.
The key starting point for any GAP would be to follow the architecture of the
GDPR and of its predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. These legal
instruments established a rule of “free movement of personal data” within the
European Union along with strong data privacy requirements. Similarly, under the
GAP, a member state could not refuse to transfer data to another member state on
data privacy grounds unless that other state failed to meets its treaty obligations.
Achieving a GAP would require agreement on its core substantive privacy
commitments, dispute resolution mechanism, and enforcement apparatus.
To be sure, the substantive issue is a thorny one. To return to the bananas
comparison, food safety and health are promoted by recourse to international food
safety standards. Phytosanitary rules supported by the WTO help assure that

231
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bananas can be grown anywhere and can be consumed safely everywhere.233 At first
glance, moreover, data privacy may seem an unlikely candidate for the development
of global norms. The issue is whether a global privacy consensus will be possible.
On this score, in 1997, Charles Raab observed that achieving harmonization on data
privacy was proving difficult even within the European Union.234 But Joel
Reidenberg was more hopeful. Writing in 2000, Reidenberg argued that democratic
states had converged on a set of “First Principles” with respect to privacy, set forth
in the fair information practice principles, but differ significantly on questions of
implementation.235 We believe that the potential for convergence around shared
principles of fair information practices has only deepened since that time, in large
part because of the efforts of the European Union.236 Even the United States, which
has famously lacked a comprehensive EU-style data protection law, now has a
growing number of more comprehensive privacy statutes at the state level.237
A consensus concerning privacy law would also be politically and economically
valuable and, hence, in the interests of many parties. The shared economic interests
in cross-border data flows would support efforts to find a consensus. Cross-border
data flows are critical, not just for U.S. big tech, but for European and other
enterprises, large and small. While the United States often expresses concerns about
data protectionism from the European Union, the European Union worries about
data protectionism in foreign countries that might disadvantage commercial
enterprises in its member states. Indeed, a key goal of its trade negotiations is the
elimination of such barriers. As the European Commission makes clear, “When
negotiating trade agreements, the EU proposes the straightforward prohibition of
protectionist barriers to cross-border data flows.”238 Finally, a GAP need no more
repress different cultural values than the GDPR. This latter document has set
acceptable privacy rules for EU member states ranging from Denmark to Estonia
to France to Germany to Hungary to Latvia to Spain.
In developing its core commitments around privacy, the GAP has two paths
open to it. It can develop substantive privacy commitments internally as part of the
treaty negotiation process, or set up a mechanism for establishing such substantive
commitments externally, which it would then incorporate by reference. A potential
The relevant WTO agreement on food safety encourages states to adopt international standards for
food safety, where available, and permits nations to adopt stricter standards as long as they are
scientifically justified. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Arts. 3.1
& 5, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm
234 Charles D. Raab, Privacy, Democracy, Information, in THE GOVERNANCE OF CYBERSPACE 161 (Brian
D. Loader ed., 1997).
235 Reidenberg, Resolving, supra note 9, at 1325. Colin Bennett also found some evidence of general
agreement in certain European nations, Canada, and the United States around these basic principles.
BENNETT, supra note 54, at 125-45.
236 Paul Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 803, 818 (2020).
237 California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798; Colorado Privacy Act, 2021 Colo.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 483 (S.B. 21-190); and Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act S.B. 1392, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021)
238 European Commission, The EU’s approach to ensuring free flow of data: Digital Trade,
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/goods-and-services/digital-trade/.
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internal process for it would be as part of the WTO’s Joint Statement Initiative on
E-Commerce.239 This initiative was launched by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe at the G20 meeting in Osaka in 2019. Abe proposed a system of “Data Free
Flow with Trust” (DFFT), which is to be based on cybersecurity and personal data
protection.240 This process of creating the DFFT is generally called the “Osaka
Track.”
Like this Article, the DFFT seeks to set up an overarching cross-border data
flow framework. Also similar to this Article’s aspirations, the DFFT aims to have
the resulting data flows narrow the gap between rich and less privileged nations.
More than eighty states, including the United States, the European Union, and
China, have joined in negotiations as part of the Osaka Track and pledged “to
achieve a high standard agreement with as many WTO Members as possible.” 241
Our review of the leaked proposals reveals, however, that the current work product
tracks the trade models represented in existing bilateral and regional trade
agreements.242 Unfortunately, the Osaka Track seems destined to preserve the
Privacy Bracket.243
While we believe that the WTO should be the locus for the proposed global
agreement on privacy, we do not think that it is the right institution to develop
substantive global privacy norms. First, the WTO typically does not set international
standards; it prefers to incorporate standards set by other expert international
bodies, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety.244 Second, the
benefits of developing international standards through a process outside the WTO
itself could leverage independent expertise in order to allay existing concerns
regarding the identification of privacy norms within an international trade regime.245

Joint
Initiative
on
E-commerce,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/joint_statement_e.htm.
240 Satoshi Sugiyama, Abe heralds launch of 'Osaka Track' framework for free cross-border data flow at G20, JAPAN
TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/06/28/national/abe-heraldslaunch-osaka-track-framework-free-cross-border-data-flow-g20/#.XR6JnugzaUk;
Shinzo
Abe,
Defeatism about Japan is now defeated (Jan 23, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/abespeech-transcript/.
241 WTO, E-commerce co-convenors welcome substantial progress in negotiations, Joint Statement on E-Commerce
(Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/ecom_14dec21_e.htm.
242 WTO plurilateral ecommerce draft consolidated text, https://www.bilaterals.org/?wto-plurilateralecommerce-draft (text dated Dec. 14, 2020).
243 WTO Electronic Commerce Negotiations, Consolidated Negotiating Text – December 2020,
INF/ECOM/62/Rev.1
(Dec.
14,
2020),
https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/wto_plurilateral_ecommerce_draft_consolidated_text.pdf.
244 World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (May 1998),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm (noting that the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures promotes international standards for food safety,
including the Codex Alimentarius).
245 The major exception to this rule is in intellectual property, where the Agreement on the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) sets out substantive minimum standards for the
protection of intellectual property. TRIPS was negotiated as part of a multiplex set of agreements,
including in goods and services, with developing countries finally agreeing to TRIPS’ substantive
requirements in return for better access to Western markets. JAYASHREE WATAL & ANTONY
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As an example of these suspicions, Margot Kaminski has argued that “trade is not
the place … to negotiate privacy.” She worries about trade agreements “bundling
issues” in a way that would deprioritize privacy while privileging access by private
companies.246 One way to respond to these concerns would be to draw on an
external locus for consensus building and negotiations.
A prime candidate for such a role would be the Global Privacy Assembly
(GPA). Formed in 1979, the GPA is the leading international forum for the world’s
privacy officials.247 Today, some 82 nations participate in it, greatly increasing the
GPA’s representativeness since its origins as a meeting place largely for European
privacy officials.248 In short, the GPA is the international organization with the
greatest institutional expertise in the area of data privacy. While the Assembly has,
at least thus far, avoided issuing international instruments, in 2020, it introduced
“Joint Statements” for promoting “a global regulatory environment based on
commonly held principles of data protection.”249 Through its Global Frameworks
and Standards Working Group, it has also begun work on established “key
principles that members can agree on.”250
With its substantive standards in place, the GAP would include a commitment
that countries adopting and enforcing its international standard would be
considered “adequate” to receive data from all other member states. No additional
consents or other safeguards would be necessary for parties to transfer data to other
countries within the framework. Privacy rules might still limit data transfers to third
parties, but not simply because the entity is located a foreign jurisdiction as long as
that country has signed the GAP.
At the same time, and to account for cultural and political differences around
data privacy values, the GAP’s “free flow” rule would be subject to negotiated
exclusions that each country could specify in their schedules. National sensitivities
around particular types of data vis-à-vis particular foreign nations will likely be the
focus of such negotiated exceptions. As an example, South Korea’s national security
concerns with respect to the export of detailed mapping data would be an
appropriate subject for an exclusion that it might wish to include in a schedule.251
TAUBMAN, THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY
ROUND NEGOTIATIONS (2015).
246 Margot Kaminski, Why trade is not the place for the EU to negotiate privacy, INTERNET POLICY REVIEW
(Jan.
23,
2015),
https://policyreview.info/articles/news/why-trade-not-place-eu-negotiateprivacy/354.
247 See Global Privacy Assembly, https://globalprivacyassembly.org/
As its website states, “The Global Privacy Assembly first met in 1979 as the International Conference
of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners. The Assembly has been the premier global forum for
data protection and privacy authorities for more than four decades.” Id.
248
Global Privacy Assembly, Accredited Members 2021 (last visited Feb. 14, 2022),
https://globalprivacyassembly.org/participation-in-the-assembly/list-of-accredited-members/.
249 GPA, Joint Statements, https://globalprivacyassembly.org/document-archive/joint-statements/
250 Denham, supra note 16.
251 Ellen Powell, Why South Korea refuses to share mapping data with Google, CSMONITOR (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/1118/Why-South-Korea-refuses-to-share-mappingdata-with-Google
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Once substantive norms are agreed upon, the next question will be
enforcement. Here is the key advantage of the WTO as an international law forum,
and why it is the proper forum in which to anchor the GAP. The usual reason for
seeking to place a global norm within the WTO is that it offers an effective
international enforcement mechanism in the form of trade sanctions against
countries that fail their obligations. If a country failed to enforce international
privacy rules, its trading partners could suspend personal data flows to it unless
additional safeguards were met.
While no country has brought a privacy-based enforcement action during the
quarter-century of the WTO’s existence, we believe this result follows because the
Privacy Bracket lacks detailed rules on privacy. The GAP would remedy that
absence and, thereby, promote enforcement actions. As is typical for international
trade agreements at the WTO, it would rely on international enforcement where a
country failed to enforce its substantive norms domestically.252 The GAP should
also include mechanisms for monitoring and review, including national reporting
obligations and periodic reviews of the practical workings of the substantive parts
of the agreement.
The benefits of a world privacy treaty agreement are legion. Rather than having
to hire lawyers or build out data infrastructures in multiple jurisdictions, a small
business could bind itself to the GAP’s substantive norms and supply the world
with its services and goods. The manifold benefits of a global internet would be
preserved against the splintering that this Article has cataloged.
But there would also be costs to achieving a global privacy agreement. Nations
would have to prove willing to compromise on certain aspects of data protection
law to reach broad agreement. These compromises are already taking place,
however, as the European Union has demonstrated in its far different approaches
and varying substantive requirements when negotiating with Japan, the United
Kingdom, or the United States. The creation of the GAP would make decisions
involving privacy and trade more transparent and more international.
CONCLUSION
The promise of the internet is to heighten equality across the world by
permitting individuals and businesses to engage with each other in ways that border
controls and immigration rules had made impossible for centuries past. The
promise of global privacy law is to protect personal information as it moves from
country to country. And the promise of trade is to allow anyone to benefit from
new opportunities on the digital frontier by selling and buying goods and services
across the world. Remarkably, the internet, modern trade law, and contemporary
privacy law were formed simultaneously in the 1990’s with an awareness of these
future prizes. But rather than coming closer to fruition, these promises are receding
as privacy and trade come into increasing conflict. Thomas Friedman once famously
Most of the privacy enforcement would take place at the local level, not at the international level.
The substantive norms would have to be enforceable in the domestic system.
252
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claimed that the “world is flat.” In his view, the internet was equalizing access for
business across the world, including in the Global South.253 But the regulatory
thicket created by global privacy rules means that this aspiration is increasingly
remote.
This Article sounds the alarm regarding the current crisis and charts an
ambitious agenda to fortify both privacy and trade. It proposes a Global Privacy
Agreement that will be negotiated, like GATS, within the World Trade
Organization, but with its substantive privacy norms developed within an expert
institution, such as the Global Privacy Assembly. By drawing on such external
expertise, a new privacy trade agreement will be responsive to concerns regarding
the de-prioritization of privacy. This Article sets out a path to promote selfdetermination and economic opportunity as part of an advancement of privacy and
trade.

THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
294 (2007) (using a catchphrase from Indian business processing outsourcing pioneer Nandan Nilekani
to argue that the internet equalized access to businesses around the world).
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Privacy and/or Trade: Appendices
Appendix I: National Laws with An Adequacy-Type Standard
for Data Exports
Country
Andorra

Angola

Argentina
Australia

Bahrain

Benin

Bermuda

Botswana

Provision
Qualified Act 15/2003 of 18 December,
of personal data protection, Jan. 21,
2004, ch. VI, art. 35 (“level of data
protection equivalent, at least, to that
established in this Law”).
Lei No. 22/2011 Ante-Projecto de Lei
da Proteção de Dados Pessoais [Law No.
22/2011 for the Protection of Personal
Data],
2011, sec. VI, art. 33 (“ensure an
adequate level of protection”).
Law No. 25.326, Oct. 4, 2000, ch. II, art.
12 (“adequate levels of protection”).
Privacy Act 1988 sch 1 pt 3 (“at least
substantially similar to the way in which
the Australian Privacy Principles protect
the information”).
Law No. (30) of 2018 with Respect to
Personal Data Protection Law, Jul. 12,
2018, sec. Three, art. 12 (“provide
adequate legislative and regulatory
protection for personal data”).
Law No. 2009-09 of May 22, 2009
Dealing with the protection of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) in the
Republic of Benin, May 19, 2009, ch. II,
art. 9 (“sufficient degree of privacy,
liberty and unalienable rights
protection”).
Personal Information Protection Act of
2016, Jul. 27, 2016, part 2, sec. 15(3)
(“When assessing the level of protection
in subsection (2) . . . the Minister, on the
recommendation of the Commissioner,
may designate any jurisdiction as
providing a comparable level of
protection for the purposes of this
section”).
Data Protection Act, 2018, Aug. 3, 2018,
part VIII, sec. 49(1) (“the transfer of
personal data that is undergoing
processing or intended processing, to a
third country may only take place if the
third country to which the data is
transferred ensures an adequate level of
protection”).
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Brazil

Cabo Verde

Cayman Islands

Chile (2017 draft)
Colombia
Dubai

Ecuador

Egypt

Gabon

54

Lei No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto de
2018 [Law No. 13,709, Aug. 14, 2018],
ch. V, arts. 33-34; (“degree of protection
of personal data adequate to the
provisions of this Law”).
Law No. 41/VIII/2013, Sep. 17, 2013,
ch. I, arts. 19-20 (“ensures an adequate
level of protection”).
The Data Protection Law, 2017 sch I pt
1 principle 8 (“Personal data shall not be
transferred to a country or territory
unless that country or territory ensures
an adequate level of protection for the
rights and freedoms of data subjects”).
Law No. 001-365, 2017, title V, art. 27
(“adequate levels of data protection”).
L. 1581, octubre 17, 2012, title VIII, art.
26 (“adequate levels of data protection”).
Data Protection Law 2020, Jul. 1, 2020,
part 4, sec. 26(a)(1) (“an adequate level
of protection”.
Ley Orgánica de Protección de Datos
Personales [Organic Law for the
Protection of Personal Data], 26 de
Mayo 2021, Quinto Suplemento del
Registro Oficial, ch. IX, art. 56 (“provide
adequate levels of protection”).
Law No. 151 of 2020 (Promulgating the
Personal Data Protection Law), 13 July
2020, ch. 7, art. 14 (“Transfer of
Personal Data . . . may only be
undertaken if the level of data protection
or security in the foreign country meets
(or exceeds) the requirements stipulated
under this Law, and subject to obtaining
a relevant License or Permit from the
Center”).
Loi no. 001/2011 relative à la protection
des données à caractère personnel [Law
No. 001/2011on the Protection of
Personal Data], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF GABON], Oct. 31, 2011, ch.
VI, sec. II, art. 94 (“controller cannot
transfer personal data to another State
only if this State ensures a sufficient level
of privacy protection, fundamental rights
and freedoms”).
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Guernsey

Honduras (2018 draft)

Hong Kong

India (2019 draft)

Japan

Jersey

Kazakhstan

Kenya

55

The Data Protection (Bailiwick of
Guernsey) Law, 2017, Apr. 26, 2017, sec.
57(1) (“A controller or processor may
transfer personal data to a person in an
unauthorised jurisdiction if the Authority
has [generally or] specifically authorised
the transfer”).
Anteproyecto de Ley de Protección de
Datos Personales y Acción de Hábeas
Data de Honduras [Draft Law on the
Protection of Personal Data and Action
of Habeas Data from Honduras], 2018,
title IX, art. 40 (“adequate levels of
treatment and protection”).
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, No.
343, (1996), part 6, sec. 33(3)
(“reasonable grounds for believing that
there is in force in a place outside Hong
Kong any law which is substantially
similar to, or serves the same purposes
as, this Ordinance”).
The Personal Data Protection Act, 2019,
No. 373, ch. VII, sec. 34(1)(b)(i)
(“adequate level of protection”).
Amended Act on the Protection of
Personal Information, Law No. 57 of
2003 as amended in 2015, ch. IV, art. 24
(“foreign country establishing a personal
information protection system
recognized to have equivalent
standards”).
Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2018, 16th
February 2018, part 8, sec. 66(1)
(“ensures an adequate level of protection
for the rights and freedoms of data
subjects in relation to the processing of
personal data”).
The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan
No. 94-V, 21 May, 2013, ch. 2, art. 16
(“ensuring of protection of personal . . .
in accordance with this Law”).
The Data Protection Act, (2019), KENYA
GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT NO. 181, § IV
par. 48(b) (“the data controller or data
processor has given proof to the Data
Commissioner of the appropriate
safeguards with respect to the security
and protection of personal data, and the
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Kyrgyzstan

Lesotho

Macao

Madagascar

Malaysia

Mali

Monaco

Montenegro

56

appropriate safeguards including
jurisdictions with commensurate data
protection laws”).
Law N 58, 21st February 2008, ch. IV;
art. 25(1) (“It takes into account the
personal data of the recipient party in
accordance with the contract protection
and protection at the appropriate level
established in the Kyrgyz Republic”).
The Data Protection Act, (2011),
LESOTHO GOVERNMENT GAZETTE NO.
19, part IV, sec. 52 (“are substantially
similar to the information pr.otection
principles under this Act”).
Act 8/2005 Personal Data Protection
Act, 10 August 2005, ch. V, art. 19(1)
(“provided the legal system in the
destination to which they are transferred
ensures an adequate level of
protection”).
Loi No. 2014 – 038 Sur la protection des
données à caractère personnel [Law No.
2014 – 038 on the Protection of Personal
Data], Dec. 16, 2004, ch. III, art. 20
(“only if the recipient state has legislation
ensuring a level protection of persons
similar to that provided by this law”).
Personal Data Protection Act 2010, part
X, sec. 129 (“adequate level of protection
. . . at least equivalent to the level of
protection afforded by this Act”).
Loi 2013-15 du 21 mai 2013 Portant
Protection des Donnes a Caractere
Personnel en Republique du Mali [Law
2013-15 of May 21, 2013 on Personal
Data in the Republic of Mali], May 9,
2013, sec. 4, art. 11 (“sufficient level of
personal protection”).
Law No. 1.353 of December 4, 2008
relating to the protection of personal
information, April 1, 2009, ch. III, art. 20
(“relative to the protection of provided
that the country or organization to which
the transfer takes place has a level of
adequate protection”).
Personal Data Protection Law, Official
Gazette of Montenegro 79/08 and
70/09, ch. IV, art. 41 (“The adequacy of
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Morocco

New Zealand
Nigeria

North Macedonia

Pakistan (2020 draft)

Panama

Paraguay (2021 draft)

Peru
Russia

57

the measures of protection referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
assessed in the light of all the
circumstances surrounding a data
transfer”).
Loi no. 09-08 relative à la protection des
personnes physiques à l’égard du
traitement des données à caractère
personnel [Law No. 09-08 on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to
the Processing of Personal Data], Feb.
18, 2009, ch. V, art. 43 (“ensures a
sufficient level of protection of privacy
and fundamental rights and freedoms of
individuals”).
Privacy Act 2020, part 8, sec. 193
(“comparable safeguards to those in this
Act”).
Data Protection Regulation (2019), part
two, 2.11 (“ensures an adequate level of
protection”).
Law on Personal Data Protection, 2020,
ch. V, art. 49 (“A transfer of personal
data to a third country or an
international organisation may take place
where the Agency has decided that the
third country or the international
organisation in question ensures an
adequate level of protection”).
Personal Data Protection Bill (2021), sec.
14 (“data protection at least equivalent to
the protection provided under this Act”).
Ley 81-2019 Sobre Proteccion de Datos
Personales [Law 81-2019 on the
Protection of Personal Data], 26 March
2019, ch. III, art. 33 (“equivalent or
superior level of protection”).
Proyecto de Ley de Protección de Datos
Personales en Paraguay [Draft Law on
the Protection of Personal Data in
Paraguay], 30 April 2021, title VII, art. 57
(“adequate level of protection”).
Data Protection Law, June 9, 2010, title
I, art. 11 (“sufficient level of
protection”).
Federal Law of the Russian Federation
on Personal Data, 27 July 2006, ch. 2,
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Sao Tomé and Principe

Serbia

Singapore

South Africa

Sri Lanka (2021 draft)

Taiwan

Tajikistan

58

art. 12 (“foreign states providing
adequate protection”).
Lei no. 03/2016 Visa Garantir e Proteger
os dados pessoais das Pessoas Singulares
[Law No. 03/2016 to Guarantee and
Protect Personal Data of Individuals], 10
May 2016, ch. V, art. 19 (“ensure an
adequate level of protection”).
Zakon o Zaštiti Podataka o Ličnosti
[Law on Personal Data Protection],
2008, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SERBAI No. 97/08, ch.
VIII, art. 53 (“Data may be transferred
from the Republic of Serbia to a state
not signatory to the Convention, or
international organisation, if in this state
or international organisation regulations
or contract on transfer provide for a
level of data protection in accordance
with the Convention”).
Personal Data Protection Act 2012,
2020, part VI, sec. 26 (“standard of
protection to personal data . . .
comparable to the protection under this
Act”).
Protection of Personal Information Act
No. 4 of 2013, ch. 9, sec. 72(1)(a)
(“adequate level of protection”).
Personal Data Protection Act, 25
November 2021, THE GAZETTE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
SRI LANKA, part III, sec. 26(1)
(“pursuant to an adequacy decision”).
Personal Data Protection Act, December
30, 2015, ch. III, art. 21 (“the central
government authority in charge of the
industry concerned may impose
restrictions on such transfer . . . where
the country receiving the personal data
lacks proper regulations on protection of
personal data”).
Law on the Protection of Personal Data,
2018, ch. III, art. 18 (“Transboundary
transfer of personal data to the territory
of foreign states, which ensures equal
protection of the rights of personal data
subjects, shall be carried out in
accordance with this Law”).
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Thailand

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates - Abu Dhabi
Global Market

59

B.E. 2562 (2019), Personal Data
Protection Act, 27 May 2019, part 3, sec.
28 (“the destination country or
international organization that receives
such Personal Data shall have adequate
data protection standard”).
Act No. 13 of 2011, Protection of
Personal Privacy and Information Act,
22 June 2011, part III, sec. 72(4)(b) (“not
satisfied that the jurisdiction to which
the information is being sent has
comparable safeguards, the organization
shall refer the matter to the
Commissioner for a determination as to
whether the other jurisdiction has
comparable safeguards as provided by
this Act and inform the individual”).
Organic Act no. 2004-63 of July 27th
2004 on the protection of personal data,
2004, ch. IV, art. 47 (“can only take place
if this country ensures an adequate level
of protection assessed with regard to all
the elements relating to the nature of the
data to transfer”).
Law on Protection of Personal Data No.
6698, 2016, ch. II, art. 9 (“countries
where sufficient level of protection is
provided”).
The Data Protection and Privacy Act,
2019, 25 February 2019, part III, par. 19
(“the country in which the data is
processed or stored has adequate
measures in place for the protection of
personal data at least equivalent to the
protection provided by for this Act”).
On Personal Data Protection, 2010,
OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF THE
VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE (BVR),
NO. 34, ART. 481, Article 29 (“only if the
relevant state provides adequate
protection of personal data in cases
established by law or international treaty
of Ukraine”).
Data Protection Regulations, 2021, part
4, sec. 41 (“A transfer of Personal Data
outside of ADGM or to an International
Organisation may take place where the
Commissioner of Data Protection has
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United Kingdom

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Zambia

Zimbabwe

60

decided that the receiving jurisdiction,
one or more specified sectors within that
jurisdiction, or the International
Organisation in question ensures an
adequate level of protection of Personal
Data”).
Data Protection Act, 2018, c. 5, para. 73
(“based on an adequacy decision”).
Ley No. 18331 Ley de Proteccion de
Datos Personales [Law No. 18331 on
Protection of Personal Data], 18 August
2008, ch. IV, art. 23 (“adequate levels of
protection”).
Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on
Personal Data, Oct. 1, 2019, ch. III, art.
15 (“Cross-border transfer of personal
data is carried out on the territory of
foreign states that provide adequate
protection of the rights of subjects of
personal data”).
The Data Protection Act of 2021, part X,
§ 71(2) (“The Minister may . . . prescribe
the criteria for cross border data
transfers . . . where the Minister
considers that —(a) the relevant personal
data shall be subject to an adequate level
of protection, having regard to the
applicable laws and international
agreements; and (b) the enforcement of
data protection laws by authorities with
appropriate jurisdiction is effective”).
Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill,
2019, part VIII, sec. 28 (“a data
controller may not transfer personal
information about a data subject to a
third party who is in a foreign country
unless an adequate level of protection is
ensured in the country of the recipient”).
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Appendix II: Age of Consent for Data Processing
Location
Brazil

California
China

European Union

Age
18

13
14

13–16

India

18

Japan

15

Source
Lei No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto
de 2018 [Law No. 13,709, Aug.
14, 2018] (General Personal Data
Protection Act “LGPD”); see
Ana Carolina Cagnoni, How
Brazil regulates children's privacy and
what to expect under the new data
protection law, IAPP (Oct. 29,
2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/howbrazil-regulates-childrensprivacy-and-what-to-expectunder-the-new-data-protectionlaw/.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100.
信息安全技术 个人信息安全
规范 [Information security
technology—Personal
information (PI) security
Specification] (effective Oct. 01,
2021), Mar. 6, 2020, at sec. 3.2.
Article 8(1) of the GDPR,
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the
European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons
with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119).
The Personal Data Protection
Act, 2019 (draft).
Amended Act on the Protection
of Personal Information, Law
No. 57 of 2003 as amended in
2015.
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